腾讯会走向垄断吗？
10年前马化腾就为“腾讯垄断”的罪名喊冤：
Ten years ago, Ma Huateng felt deeply wronged for the charge of "Tencent’s Monopolization":
“垄断是一个令人烦恼的罪名，但有时候确实是一个假想的罪名。"
"Monopolization is an annoying charge, but sometimes it is just a hypothetical charge."
但10年过去了，你觉得现在还有人在说腾讯垄断吗？我在上集DannyData视频征集大家对腾讯的问题，被点赞最多的就是：“腾讯会不会走向垄断？”看来马化腾还需要继续喊冤啊。
Ten years have passed, do people still think that Tencent is a monopolized company? When I collected your questions about Tencent in the last episode of DannyData, the one that got the most likes was: "Will Tencent become a monopolized company?" It seems that Ma Huateng needs to explain more.
而且我预计10年后，说腾讯垄断的声音还会存在，到时候看看老丹尼是“带预言家”还是“打脸永动机”。
And I predict that 10 years later, the criticism of Tencent's monopolization will still be there. Let’s see then if Old Danny is a prophet or I have to eat my own words again.
那今天我就从三个方面来讲讲：腾讯会不会走向垄断呢？
In this episode, I will answer the question in three aspects: Will Tencent become a monopolized company?
我是小丹尼，谈车说科技。本集视频论据仍然遵循我的洁癖标准：随你反驳，所有论据都是腾讯一手信息。其实我说“随你反驳”，意思是我非常欢迎有理、有据、有数据的反驳，但如果是杠精反驳，那一定是你对。
I'm Danny, I talk about tech and cars. As usual, all information used in my video is authentic and first-hand. You're welcome to disagree with my arguments, but don't doubt my sources. Well, what I mean "disagree with my arguments" is that I welcome a rational debate with facts and data, but if you are a devil’s advocate, then you must be right.
我知道很多小同学想听我直接说结论：“小丹尼你就说腾讯到底是不是垄断吧？”抱歉这个问题我无法给你简单粗暴的结论，我只能掰开揉碎从三个方面给你讲：
I know that many of you are waiting for a conclusion: "Danny, just tell us whether Tencent is a monopolized company." Sorry guys, I can't give you a simple and rough conclusion, but break the question into three small ones:
1、腾讯垄断了什么？
2、腾讯没垄断什么？
3、腾讯以后还会垄断吗？
1. What does Tencent monopolize?
2. What does Tencent not monopolized?
3. Will Tencent monopolize on anything in the future?
为什么我要从三个方面来讲？这就好比你问我：“米其林餐厅到底好吃不好吃？”米其林餐厅有法式大餐，也有街边牛腩；有拿手好菜，也有垃圾充数。而腾讯垄断的问题，可能比米其林餐厅是否好吃还要复杂。
Why do I talk from three aspects? This is just like you asking me: "Is Michelin-starred restaurant good or not?" Michelin-starred restaurant has French cuisine and also street sirloin. There are specialty dishes, but also token dishes. Whether Tencent is a monopolized company may be a more complicated question than whether food in a Michelin-starred restaurant is delicious.
01 腾讯垄断了什么
先说第一点：腾讯垄断了什么？
So, the first point: what does Tencent monopolize?
我先抛出一个可能会刺激某些小同学心脏的观点：大家没必要过分批判垄断。
Let me first give a point of view that might be repellent to you: people don't have to criticize monopolization too harshly.
估计这里会有人反驳我了："垄断你还不让人批判？小丹尼你是不是支持搞独裁？" 慢着，大帽子先别急着给我扣上。请听我解释为什么"不要过分批判垄断"，有两个原因。
Some of you may disagree with me: "Monopolization should not be criticized? Do you support dictatorship, Danny?" Hold on, don't get me wrong. Please let me explain why not to criticize monopolization too harshly. There are two reasons.
第一个原因，垄断之争，其实就是定义范围之争。注意关键词：定义范围。
The first reason, the monopolization dispute is a dispute over the defined scopes. Pay attention to the keywords: the defined scopes.
比如你的班主任在你们班的权威就是垄断的，定义范围就是你们班；你妈在你家的财务管理是垄断的，定义范围就是你家；你对自己的时间管理也是垄断的，定义范围就是你自己。
For example, your class teacher has a monopoly on authority in the scope of your class; your mother has a monopoly on financial management in the scope of your family; you have a monopoly on time management in the scope of yourself.
类似的，讨论一家公司是不是垄断，也要定义范围：它到底垄断了什么？
Similarly, when discussing whether a company is monopolized, it is also necessary to define the scopes: what does it monopolize?
比如如果定义范围是全球搜索引擎，那谷歌肯定是垄断的，如果定义范围是科技产品，那谷歌就是不垄断的。
For example, if the scope is global search engines, then it is monopolized by Google. If the scope is technology products, then Google is not a monopoly.
再比如当年人人批判微软搞垄断，微软强迫制造商预装自己的IE浏览器和媒体播放器等等，其实也是定义范围之争，比如微软辩称说IE浏览器是Windows系统的一部分，而网景等公司状告微软浏览器就是独立的，不能搞捆绑销售。
Another example is the criticism towards Microsoft for monopolization when it forced manufacturers to pre-install its IE browser and media player. Actually, this is also a dispute over the defined scopes. Microsoft argued that the IE browser is a part of the Windows system, and other companies like Netscape sued Microsoft that the browser is independent and cannot be bundled.
所以很多问题都是定义范围之争，包括我之前和老蒋 中路对狙辩论视频 ，感兴趣可以去看。
As such, many issues are disputes over the scopes, just like in the previous video I debated with Lao Jiang. You can watch it if you are interested.
所以腾讯到底垄断了什么呢？如果你的定义范围是“中国互联网社交产品”，那腾讯就是垄断的，比如你可以从DannyData数据可视化看出，腾讯2020年一季度，微信和WeChat的每月活跃用户数MAU已经高达12.03亿。
So what exactly does Tencent monopolize? If your scope is "Chinese Internet social products", then Tencent is a monopoly. You can see from the visualized data in DannyData that the monthly active users (MAU) of WeChat in the first quarter of 2020 has reached 1.203 billion.
腾讯微信&QQ总月活跃用户数
第二个原因，很多互联网业务，就是要有寡头垄断的，或者叫赢家通吃。
The second reason is that many Internet businesses require an oligopoly. In other words, the winner takes all.
比如互联网的底层应用——社交，就是一个赢家通吃的业务，国外是Facebook，国内是腾讯，背后的逻辑是梅特卡夫定理（Metcalfe‘s Law）：
For example, the underlying application of the Internet, social networking, is a winner-take-all business. Facebook is the winner in foreign countries and Tencent is the domestic one. The rationale behind is Metcalfe’s Law:
“在Internet中，当节点或叫用户之间的连线数目增加时，这些连线造成的效果会呈倍数增加，即网络总的交易机会正比于基于Internet节点数目的平方。”
"On the Internet, when the number of nodes or the connections between users increases, the effect caused by these connections will increase exponentially. That is, the total transaction opportunity of the network is proportional to the square of the number of nodes based on the Internet."
说白了就是你的七大姑八大姨每多一个人用微信，产生的效用并不是线性增长而是指数型增长。你可以简单理解为1+1>4，意思是你和朋友交换了信息，双方不只是获得了对方的信息，还能产生火花，碰撞出新的信息。
To put it bluntly, every one more member in your family uses WeChat, the effect is not linear but exponential growth. You can simply understand as 1+1>4, which means that when you and your friend exchange information, the two of you not only obtain the information about each other but also spark new information.
其实腾讯不只是其核心业务“社交”在中国市场垄断，还包括微信支付、甚至包括引入社交元素的在线游戏细分品类等等，都可以说是垄断的，
In fact, Tencent not only has a monopoly on its core business social networks in the Chinese market, but also on WeChat payment, and even on online game segments that involve social elements, etc.
关键看你的定义范围是什么。
The key point is to define scopes.
正如俞军在在《产品方法论》中所说：
As Yu Jun said in "Product Methodologies":
“不是只有市场份额的独家垄断或寡头垄断才叫垄断，因为产品有情境性，所以在任何情景下只要让用户没有选择，就形成了局部垄断。" “Monopoly not only exists whenever there is an exclusive monopoly or oligopoly of market share because a product has its contextuality. As long as it can leave users with no choice in any scenario, a local monopoly will be formed.”
比如，你的定义范围是（移动端）吃鸡类游戏，腾讯的《和平精英》、《堡垒之夜》就是垄断的；你的定义范围是FPS类游戏，腾讯的《穿越火线》、《使命召唤》就是垄断的，玩过以上这些腾讯游戏的同学请举个手。
For example, your scope is (mobile device) PUBG-like game, Tencent's "Game for Peace " and "Fortnite" are monopolized; if your defined scope is FPS games, Tencent's "Crossfire" and "Call of Duty" are monopolies. Please raise your hand if you have played these Tencent games.
游戏市场是一个非常典型的头部垄断的市场。所以，腾讯需要主导的关键业务，其实就是要去垄断的。
The game market is a very typical monopoly market. Therefore, the critical business that Tencent needs to lead is actually to monopolize.
那腾讯的关键业务是什么呢？
What is the critical business of Tencent?
我们可以从腾讯的收入结构来分析腾讯业务的底层逻辑。腾讯的收入结构分成五大类，包括社交网络、在线游戏、在线广告、互联网金融与商业服务和其他，99%的收入来源是前四者。
We can analyze the underlying logic of Tencent's business from its revenue structure. Tencent's revenue structure includes five parts, social networks, online games, online advertising, Internet finance, and business services and others. The former four services provide 99% of the revenue.
而社交网络+在线游戏收入仍然占大头，在腾讯财报里统称为增值服务收入，2020年一季度占整体收入的58%。
The majority of revenue comes from the social network and online game, collectively referred to as value-added service revenue in Tencent's earnings report. It occupied 58% of overall revenue in the first quarter of 2020.
我们再更进一步分析，你可以从这张齿轮图看出来：
Let's analyze it further, you can learn from this gear diagram:
你看这个图它又长又宽，中间那个蓝色齿轮是社交它又大又圆，周围5个小齿轮分别是在线游戏、媒体、金融科技、云服务和公用程序。所以腾讯的底层关键业务还是基于社交，而腾讯社交在中国就是垄断的。
You could see this picture is long and wide. The blue gear in the middle represents the social network. It is large and round. The five small gears graphics around it are online games, media, financial technology, cloud services, and utilities. So Tencent's underlying principal business is still based on the social network, and Tencent social network is a monopoly in China.
说到社交，我多说两句啊，大家都知道抖音和快手这种短视频增长势头很猛，那你认为抖音快手对腾讯的威胁大吗？
Speaking of social network, I would like to say a few more words. Everyone knows that short videos, like TikTok and Kuaishou, are growing very fast. Do you think that TikTok and Kuaishou are big threats on Tencent?
我看有人说抖音快手只是撼动了腾讯互娱中的一小部分，除了短视频，腾讯互娱中还有长视频、游戏、音乐文字等等，你赞同这个观点吗？
I've noticed that some people claimed that TikTok and Kuaishou only have impact on a small part of Tencent interactive entertainment. In addition to short videos, Tencent interactive entertainment also has long videos, games, music, and text, etc. Do you agree?
反正我不赞同。我认为抖音快手这种短视频，撼动的绝不只是腾讯互娱中的一小部分，还有腾讯整体的两大部分。
Anyway, I cannot agree with it. I think that the short video of TikTok or Kuaishou not only affect a small part of Tencent interactive entertainment business but also two larger parts of Tencent's business.
先说第一大部分，抖音快手撼动了腾讯社交的根基，视频社交一定会是未来大趋势，就像国外的后浪们用Facebook越来越少，连SnapChat这种更潮的“阅后即焚”照片社交平台也受到了冲击，现在兴起的是像Monkey这种为Generation Z打造的陌生人视频社交平台，以后我会请Monkey的创始人来DannyPal节目里聊聊，大家可以期待一下。
Let's talk about the first part. TikTok and Kuaishou have shaken the foundation of Tencent's social network. Video socialization will be a future trend.
Like the overseas young people are using Facebook less and less, even the more trendy Snapchat, a "self-destruct" photo social platform, has also been attacked Now, a stranger-based video social platform like Monkey has been created for Generation Z. In the future, I will invite the founder of Monkey to talk on the DannyPal program.
You could look forward to it.
我赞同潘乱老师在《腾讯没有梦想》文章里所说：
I agree with what Luan Pan said in the article "Tencent Has No Dream":
抖音快手这种“算法＋短视频＋开放式关系”产品竟然奇袭了他的社交大本营，在腾讯主导了十多年的“熟人通讯＋封闭关系”之外打开了一条新路。
TikTok and Kuaishou's "algorithm + short video + open relationship" product raid his social base and opened a new path outside the scope of "acquaintance communication + closed relationship”, which Tencent has dominated more than ten years.
而且图文转视频一定是大势所趋，肯定会有大量的公众号作者逐渐流失转向各种视频平台，而且这里我不得不吐槽一下腾讯视频的同学，自从DannyData半年前开始做视频，有差不多6-7个腾讯系的视频运营同学联系我，包括但不限于腾讯视频、视频号、企鹅号、腾讯科技频道等等，用两个词来总结就是“对接混乱”+“浅尝辄止”，而且我知道还有很多内容创作者也这么认为，腾讯如果还这么干，只会流失越来越多的内容创作者，投入其他视频平台的怀抱。
And the transfer from text to the video must be a general trend. There will be a large number of WeChat Official Accounts' authors gradually turn their way to various video platforms.
And here I have to say something about the staff of Tencent Video. DannyData started uploading videos six months ago, and around 6-7 different operating staff of different platforms have contacted me, and they all belong to the Tencent Video Department.
These platforms include but not limited to Tencent Video, Videl Channel, QQ Video, and Tencent Technology Channel, etc., I can sum up this experience in two words: "Chaos" + "Superficial." I know many content creators will agree that if Tencent keeps on doing this, it will only lose more and more content creators and push them to join other video platforms.
再说抖音快手撼动腾讯的第二大部分。
Next, TikTok and Kuaishou have shaken the second largest part of Tencent.
如果我们只看中国互联网产品的日活量和每日用户时长，排名前两名的就是腾讯和字节跳动，说白了就是腾讯和字节跳动的产品都在抢占你的时间，比如抖音官方宣布截至2020年1月5日，抖音的日活跃用户已经突破4亿。
If we only look at the daily volume and daily user duration of Chinese Internet products, the top two are Tencent and ByteDance. Put simply, Tencent and ByteDance's products are seizing your time. For example, in the official announcement of TikTok as of January 5, 2020, TikTok's daily active users have exceeded 400 million.
张小龙曾说希望用户在微信上“用完即走”，那时候微信已经处于垄断地位，人人都离不开它，而且看不见厉害的对手，用不好听的话来说就是站着说话不腰疼，这就像一个亿万富翁说不希望自己家的豪宅面积太大一样。但现在，抖音快手等产品占据了用户大量时间，微信不照样还需要推出视频号、朋友圈小视频等等来去应对挑战吗？
Xiaolong Zhang once said that he hopes that users will "leave after using" on WeChat. At that time, WeChat was in a monopoly position and everyone could not live without it. Plus, it had no strong competitors in sight. It's like a billionaire saying that s/he doesn't want his/her house to be too large. But now products such as TikTok and Kuaishou have occupied a lot of users' time. WeChat still needs to launch Video Channels, Video on Moments, etc. to meet the challenge?
我自己作为第一批被邀请入驻微信视频号的内容创作者，很不看好目前视频号的发展，这个等我以后讲短视频专题时再详细聊吧。
As the first batch of content creators invited to the WeChat Video Channels, I am not optimistic about its current development. That will be discussed in detail later when I talk about the short video.
正因为抖音的强势，进而影响了腾讯广告收入。腾讯从2019年一季度开始到现在，腾讯要不是在网络广告，就是媒体广告上收入有下滑。
Because of the strength of TikTok, which in turn affected Tencent's advertising revenue. From the first quarter of 2019 to the present, Tencent has experienced a decline in revenue from the first quarter of 2019 to now, either in online advertising or media advertising.
虽然腾讯总是甩锅于宏观环境的客观原因，一次甩锅还可以，但连续5个季度甩锅那就是腾讯的不对了：
Although Tencent has always attributed the decline to the objective macro-environment. Doing this for the first time is acceptable, but saying the same thing for five consecutive quarters is Tencent's fault.
其实大家都知道，真正的原因是竞争对手的视频对腾讯的广告收入冲击很大。
In fact, everyone knows that the real reason is that competitors' videos have a significant and negative impact on Tencent's advertising revenue.
所以我说抖音快手直接动了腾讯的根基，对腾讯的直接影响就是广告收入的冲击，说白了就是金主爸爸都不爱在微信上投放了，而是跑到抖音快手上了。
So, I said that TikTok and Kuaishou directly attacked Tencent's foundation. The direct impact is on the advertising revenue. To be frank, ad sponsors like to ditribute ads on TikTok and Kuaishou but not on WeChat.
02 腾讯没垄断什么
讲完了腾讯垄断了什么，接着说第二点：腾讯没垄断什么？
After talking about what Tencent has monopolized, let's move on to the second point, what does Tencent not monopolize?
为了更好地分析腾讯垄断问题，这里我们要引入一个“丹尼四象限垄断模型”。
In order to analyze Tencent's monopoly better, here we will introduce Danny's Four-quadrant Monopoly Model.
模型的横轴表示易垄断还是难垄断，模型的纵轴表示易改变还是难改变，注意这里所说的难和易都是相对概念。
The horizontal axis of the model indicates whether it is easy or difficult to monopolize, and the vertical axis demonstrates whether it is easy to change or difficult to change. Difficult and easy mentioned here are relative.
举个例子你就明白了，比如模型的左上角代表了“难改变+易垄断”，典型的代表就是“烟酒油”行业，
For example,the upper left corner quadrant of the model represents difficult to change and easy to monopolize, the typical representative is the tobacco, wine and oil industries.
虽然这些行业我都做过咨询项目，有一定的了解，但我在DannyData视频里就不具体说了，大家也都清楚这些行业“难改变+易垄断”的原因，毕竟都是纳税大户嘛，而且这也不是腾讯涉足的行业，说白了就是哪怕像腾讯这种互联网大腿，想进也进不了的行业。
Although I have done some consulting projects in these industries and have a certain understanding, I will not talk about it in detail in DannyData's video. Everyone knows why these industries are difficult to change and easy to monopolize.
After all, they all are big taxpayers, and these are not the industries where Tencent is involved in. These industries leave no entrance for other companies, even Internet giants such as Tencent cannot get in.
再看模型的左下角，代表了“易改变+易垄断”，典型的就是我在上一点讲腾讯的核心业务，包括了社交、支付、游戏等等，相对“烟酒油”来说“易改变”，比如游戏短则几个月，支付和社交长则几年就要有一波巨变，而“易垄断”的原因我在上一点也说了，就是因为梅特卡夫定理引起的网络效应，天然形成赢家通吃。
As for the quadrant in the lower left corner, it means "easy to change + easy to monopolize." The typical example is the core business of Tencent that I mentioned earlier. It includes social network, payment, games and so on.
Compared with "tobacco, wine and oil", these businesses are easy to change. For example, every several months, there will be huge changes for games, and every few years there will be huge changes for payment and social network. The reason for "easy to monopolize" was also mentioned in the previous point, because the network effect caused by Metcalfe's Law naturally formed a winner-take-all situation.
那重点讲讲“丹尼四象限垄断模型”的右上角，指的是“难改变+难垄断”，这也是我所说的“腾讯没垄断什么”。
The upper right corner of the Danny Four-quadrant Monopoly Model refers to difficult to change and difficult to monopolize, where Tencent has no monopoly in my opinion.
典型的就是马化腾在最近财报里反复强调的“产业互联网”：
The typical example is the Industrial Internet repeatedly emphasized by Ma Huateng in recent financial reports:
比如腾讯通过微信小程序赋能的一些传统行业，你接触比较多的就是去餐厅吃饭，桌上的扫码点餐结账，整体提高了餐饮行业的效率，也让消费记录可追溯，这就是产业互联网的一种体现方式。再说前几年有一阵连锁餐饮行业在投资圈上了风口，并不是因为这些品牌一定有多好吃，而是因为微信支付、支付宝的存在使得消费记录可追溯了，重建了整个加盟体系的商业逻辑，这个等我以后讲移动支付专题再详细聊吧。
For example, Tencent has empowered some traditional industries through WeChat Mini Programs. What you are more exposed to is when eating out in restaurants. By scanning the barcode on the table, you can make an order and pay the bills. And this has improved the overall efficiency of the catering industry, and the consumption records can also be traced back.
This is a manifestation of the Industrial Internet. Besides, in the past few years, the chain restaurant industry has gained popularity in the investment circle. This doesn't necessarily because the food of these brands is delicious but because the existence of WeChat Pay and Alipay makes the consumption records traceable, and rebuilds the business logic of the entire franchise system.
This will be discussed in detail later when I talk about mobile payments.
说实话，如果作为一个商人，你面前就是摆着一个可以让你垄断的机会，你会拒绝吗？我相信绝大多数商人当然不会拒绝，因为垄断才能产生超额利润。
To be honest, if you are a businessman, and there's an opportunity that allows you to monopolize, will you refuse it? I believe that the vast majority of businessmen will certainly not refuse, because monopoly can produce excess profits.
而“丹尼四象限垄断模型”的右上角，并不是腾讯不想垄断，而是有两个原因。
The upper right corner of the Danny's Four-quadrant Monopoly Model is not monoplized, not because Tencent is not willing to do so but for the following two reasons.
第一个原因是腾讯自身原因，有些是因为精力顾不过来。
The first reason is Tencent's own reason that Tencent does not have enough energy.
连马化腾自己都说数不清腾讯的产品有多少个，动不动哪个产品又和阿里竞争了；还有些是腾讯起步已晚或自身不具备基因，比如腾讯投资京东、拼多多、美团、甚至小破站等等，腾讯都有做过类似产品但做不起来，所以只能把曾经的小对手们招安到自己旗下了，用来对抗更大的Boss，那大Boss是谁呢？请弹幕告诉我。
Even Ma Huateng himself can't tell how many products does Tencent have, and which one is competing with Alibaba's products. There are also some cases where Tencent started too late or does not have "genes". Such as Tencent's investment in Jingdong, Pinduoduo, Meituan, and even Bilibili. Tencent has developed similar products but failed, so it can only recruit its former little rivals to fight against the bigger Boss. Who is the big Boss? Type it on the screen.
第二个原因是行业的特性本身就是“难垄断”，不具备赢家通吃的网络效应。
The second reason is that the characteristics of these industries themselves are difficult to monopolize and do not have the effect of winner-take-all.
比如线下商超，腾讯再怎么努力也无法垄断全部市场，大爷大妈才不会管你这菜市场到底是不是腾讯开的，也不会携手七大姑八大姨一起去买菜，就是因为行业的特性分散难垄断，所以腾讯只能靠投资一线选手入局。
For example, the offline supermarkets. No matter how hard Tencent tries to monopolize the entire market, nobody will care whether the grocery market is opened by Tencent, nor join a family grocery squad. It is because the characteristics of this industry are scattered and difficult to monopolize, so Tencent can only enter the game by investing in first-line players.
比如马化腾所说：
“在跨界交叉融合的一些领域，找到发展的蓝海，或者叫细分市场中的细分市场。” As Ma Huateng said: "It is necessary to find a blue ocean of development in some cross-border areas where exist intersection and integration. In other words, the market segments in market segments."
比如腾讯入股永辉超市，而且2018年腾讯还差点和永辉一起入股家乐福，结果被苏宁插了一腿，这个等我以后讲苏宁时再详细聊。
For example, Tencent took a stake in Yonghui Supermarket, and in 2018 Tencent almost took a stake in Carrefour with Yonghui. However, Suning intervened. This will be discussed in detail when I talk about Suning.
所以，腾讯通过投资一线选手入局“难垄断、难改变”的行业，并通过“丹尼四象限垄断模型”左下角给他们赋能，比如基于微信的微信支付和小程序等等，帮助他们增加效率的同时，自己也分一杯羹。
Therefore, Tencent has invested in first-line players to enter the “difficult to monopolize and hard to change” industries. And it has empowered them through the lower left corner of the Danny Four-quadrant Monopoly Model, such as WeChat payment and Mini Programs based on WeChat, to help them improve efficiency. At the same time, Tencent can also share a piece of the pie.
如果你还是分不清“丹尼四象限垄断模型”左下角和右上角的区别，俞军有一个公式可以辅助你理解：
If you still can't tell the difference between the lower left corner and the upper right corner of the Danny Four-quadrant Monopoly Model, Yu Jun has a formula to help you understand:
用户价值=新体验-旧体验-替换成本
User Value = New Experience - Old Experience - Replacement Cost
你可以简单理解为左下角是“纯互联网”产品，右上角是“互联网+”产品。
You can simply understand that the lower left corner is a "pure Internet" product, and the upper right corner is an "Internet +" product.
左下角的“纯互联网”产品，关键在于“替换成本”。凭借超强的模仿能力，各家互联网产品很快就会让“新体验-旧体验”的差别不大，比如雷军的米聊比微信还要早出现一个月，而且你要说微信有哪些功能是米聊做不到的吗？基本上没有。关键区别就在于替换成本，等你的七大姑八大姨都出现在微信上了，也就是替换成本特别高，哪怕米聊新体验做的再好，但是替换成本太高了，以至于米聊提供的整体用户价值太低了，所以用户不愿意放弃微信而去用米聊。
The key to the “pure Internet” product in the lower left corner is the “replacement cost”. With super imitation capabilities, various Internet products will soon narrow the gap between new experience and the old experience. For example, Lei Jun's MiChat launched a month earlier than WeChat.
Is there any function of WeChat that MiChat can't do? The answer is not. The key is the replacement cost. When your relatives and friends all use WeChat, that is, the replacement cost is particularly high. Even if the new experience of MiChat is very well, the replacement cost is so high that the overall user value provided in MiChat is too low to persuade users to give up WeChat and use MiChat.
但如果你借助技术变革的风口，做了一款之前没有的新产品，比如抖音快手，新体验好，又没有旧体验，再加上开辟另一个战场没有太多替换成本，那么提供的用户价值就高。
But, if you take advantage of the technological revolution and develop an unprecedented product like TikTok or Kuaishou. Plus, the product has no old experience but only good new experience, and there's not much cost of entering another battlefield. Thus, the user value provided will be high.
而右上角“互联网+”产品，替换成本往往比较低，也就是我之前所说的“难垄断”，
The replacement cost of "Internet+" products in the upper right corner is often relatively low, which is what I refer to as "difficult to monopolize".
行业特征就是难以一家独大，“难改变”是因为做的是“互联网+传统行业”的加法，相比于“纯互联网”产品不会出现颠覆式的大改变，所以重点就要看“新体验-旧体验”的差别，比如亚马逊推出的无人超市Amazon Go，这个等我以后讲亚马逊时在详细聊吧，你们感兴趣吗？
The feature of this industry is the difficulty for one company to dominate."Hard to change" is means the addition of "Internet + traditional industry" can hardly be overturned, compared with "pure Internet" products. The key is the difference between "new experience - old experience", such as Amazon Go, the unmanned supermarket launched by Amazon. The detail will be discussed when I talk about Amazon later. Are you guys interested?
凯文凯利在《新经济，新规则：网络经济的十种策略》这本书里提到：
Kevin Kelly mentioned in his new book New Rules For New Economy: Ten Strategies for Network Economy:
“提升网络价值最快的方法，就是将其余的一些小网络引入到自己的网络中，这样，这个网络集合体就能以更大的网络形式运作。” "The fastest way to increase the value of the network is to introduce some of the remaining small networks into your network so that this network assembly can operate in the form of a larger network."
腾讯就是通过微信小程序、微信支付等手段，将越来越多的小网络引入到自己的社交大网络中，进而巩固自己中国社交老大的地位。换种说法就是腾讯通过主业赚钱做资本金，股票和债券融资做杠杆，专注投资头部创业公司，通过渠道赋能增值。
Tencent has been introducing more and more small networks into its social network through WeChat Mini Program, WeChat payment and other means, thereby consolidating its position as the Chinese social-life leader.
In other words, Tencent makes money through its main business as its capital, leverages stock and bond financing, focuses on investing in head start-ups, and enables value-added business through its channels.
好了，这下你搞懂“丹尼四象限垄断模型”的左下角和右上角了吧，你可能还会纳闷："hold on, hold on 小丹尼你还没讲右下角“易改变+难垄断”的是什么呢？"
Well, now you understand the left lower corner and right upper corner of Danny's Four-quadrant Monopoly Model.You may wonder: "Hold on, hold on. You haven't yet talked about what's in the right lower corner, the 'easy to change' and 'hard to monopolize'."
03 腾讯以后还会垄断吗
别急，这就到我要说的第三点：腾讯以后还会垄断吗？
Don't worry, here's my third point: Will Tencent monopolize on anything in the future?
投资圈里有一个"套路"问题：“如果腾讯或阿里也做了你现在创业做的这件事，你会怎么办？”我在朋友圈看到了戴雨森给出了一个很好的创业策略，简单概括就是先打游击战，做那些互联网大腿们看不上或者顾不上的领域、然后防御、最后再去正面硬钢。
There is a "routine" question in the investment circle: "If Tencent or Alibaba also did what you are doing now, what will you do?" Dai Yusen gave a wise entrepreneurship strategy, simply summarized, is to fight guerrilla warfare first, doing business in those areas that the Internet titans misprised or ignored, and then defend, and finally meet them head-on.
正如我之前在 DannyData视频里讲的拼多多 和以后要讲的快手，都是类似这么干的。
I've already analyzed PDD in previous DannyData video and I will talk about Kuaishou later. Both of them have done their business following this pattern.
以上说的是创业策略，我再补充一个找创业方向。
Above is about the entrepreneurship strategy and I will add one more direction for starting a business.
方向其实很简单，就是“丹尼四象限垄断模型”的右下角，即“易改变+难垄断。”
It is actually very simple. The direction lies in the lower right corner of the Danny's Four-quadrant Monopoly Model, the "easy to change" and "hard to monoplize" area.
你现在就可以思考：有哪些行业是容易改变，而且又很难被巨头垄断呢？这两者缺一不可，想清楚了这个问题，也就是像咱们这种草根创业者的机会。
You can think about it now: Which industry is easy to change and difficult to be monopolized by giants? The two are indispensable. Figuring this out and the opportunity will reveal for the ordinary entrepreneurs like us.
虽然腾讯覆盖的业务已经很多了，但互联网的魅力就是变化太快，变化太快的点不仅是创业者们最需要关注的创业方向，也是巨头们最容易短视的点。
Although Tencent has already covered a lot of fields, the charm of the Internet is its fast-changing speed. The changing point is not only the new business direction that entrepreneurs need to pay most attention, but also the point where giants are most likely to be short-sighted.
正如张一鸣曾评价腾讯：
As Zhang Yiming once commented on Tencent:
“你在一个非常有前景，非常长的跑道上，你就应该低空飞行。他应该把之前的利润都用到，再更深层次、给大规模的投入，腾讯和百度本可以取得更大的成就，相对来说他们更短视。” "You should flyover if you're on a very promising and very long runway. It should invest all its profits to a deeper and large-scale level. Tencent and Baidu could have achieved greater success. They are relatively short-sighted."
那回答我的问题：腾讯以后还会垄断吗？
Let's answer my question: Will Tencent monopolize on anything in the future?
还是我们的老规矩，定义范围，我们就说腾讯最关键的业务，也就是微信和QQ。
First, our old rules: defining the scope. We will talk about Tencent’s most critical business, WeChat and QQ.
我认为腾讯在社交领域危机是不小的。
I think Tecent has a big crisis in the social network domain.
首先微信月活12亿，基本在中国人的市场已经饱和了，增长缓慢但至少仍在增长，貌似危机不大，但增长空间已非常有限，因为全球市场Facebook的地位难以撼动，至少可以撼动Facebook的绝对不能靠类似Facebook产品线的微信，就像我们常说的“颠覆微信的绝对不是另一个微信”。腾讯目前在全球市场的突破主要还是靠游戏和投资，比如腾讯是全世界最大的游戏公司。
First of all, WeChat has a MAU of 1.2 billion. The Chinese market is basically saturated, but at least the MAU keeps growing slowly. It seems that the crisis is not big. However, the room forgrowth has been very limited, since Facebook’s status is difficult to shake in the global market.
At least, we can not count on WeChat, which is similar to the Facebook product line, to shake Facebook. As we often say, "Another WeChat cannot overthrone WeChat." Tencent's current breakthrough in the global market relies mainly on games and investment. Tencent is the world's largest game company.
而腾讯更大的危机，可以从腾讯另外一个杀手级社交QQ上看出来。
The greater crisis of Tencent can be observed from another top social network tool QQ.
为什么我说QQ可以看出腾讯更大的危机呢？
Why do I say that QQ could reveal a bigger crisis?
你可以从DannyData数据可视化看出，腾讯现在还在公布的数据是QQ智能终端月活跃账户数为6.9亿，同比下滑1%。
As you can see from the visualization of DannyData, the data that Tencent is still publishing is that the monthly number of active accounts of QQ mobile terminals is 690 million, down 1% year-on-year.
移动端QQ月活跃用户数
貌似还好，估计你会反驳我：“这不就同比下滑1%，小丹尼你是不是危言耸听？就这？”
It seems to be okay. You may refute me: "This is only a 1% year-on-year decline. Are you being an alarmist?"
虽然你看QQ同比下滑的不多，但注意这只是智能终端，而不是QQ整体月活跃账户数。其实腾讯在2019年四季度就不再公布QQ的整体月活跃账户数了，所以我预计QQ整体月活跃账户数下滑更多。
Although there is not much decline in QQ's MAU year-on-year, note that this is only the MAU of mobile terminals, not the overall MAU of QQ. In fact, Tencent no longer announces the overall MAU of QQ since the fourth quarter of 2019, so I expect the overall MAU of QQ declined more.
类似我在之前 DannyData苹果视频 里讲到的，上市公司经常出现的情况是，那些不是被要求必须公布的数字，只要一旦发现下滑趋势，干脆就不公布了，比如之前苹果的iPod、iPhone销量数字，还有我说的腾讯QQ整体月活跃账户数不公布都是如此。
This is similar to what I said in the previous DannyData video about Apple. For those non-required data, listed companies often stop publishing them as long as the downward trend is noticed, such as Apple’s previous iPod and iPhone sales figures and the MAU of QQ.
这种现象只有长期跟踪这家公司财报的同学才能发现，否则你看到的财报全是好消息。长期跟踪并让你们看懂更客观的数据，也是我们做DannyData的价值之一。
This change can only be noticed by those who have been following this company's earnings reports for a long time. Otherwise, all you'll see is good news. Following the financial reports in the long-term to help you read more objective data is one of the values that make us DannyData.
要知道QQ整体月活跃账户数下滑对腾讯的影响会更大，我们都知道“中老年人才玩微信，年轻人都玩QQ”，随着年轻一代刷视频越来越多，我是为腾讯未来能否在社交上仍然能称王称霸，持怀疑态度。
The decline in the overall MAU of QQ will have a much bigger impact on Tencent. We all know that "the old only use WeChat, the young use QQ". As the younger generation swipes more and more videos, I'm skeptical that Tencent will be able to reign supreme on social media.
腾讯自己当然早知道这种危机了，很多年前马化腾就在WE大会上说过：
Tencent itself has certainly known about this crisis, as Ma Huateng said many years ago at the WE conference：
“巨人倒下时，身上还是暖的”。 "The giant remains warm when it falls."
所以腾讯要靠投资来布局未来，腾讯早在2018年底就投资了700家公司：
So Tencent has to rely on investment to lay out its future, and it has invested in 700 companies back in late 2018.
刘炽平在2018年初的腾讯投资年会上曾透露，腾讯投资的企业所新增的价值已经超过腾讯本身的市值。
Liu Zhiping revealed at Tencent's annual investment conference in early 2018 that the value added by Tencent's portfolio companies had exceeded the market capitalization of Tencent itself.
但投资解决不了所有布局未来的问题，腾讯最怕的是那些自己投不进去的公司，比如字节跳动、阿里和国外那些互联网大腿们。
But investment can not solve all the problems of the future layout. Tencent is most afraid of those companies that it cannot invest in, such as Bytedance, Alibaba and those foreign Internet giants.
我很认同张一鸣的一段话：
I agree with a comment made by Zhang Yiming:
“当初各个公司都在围绕一些旧战场或过渡站场在竞争，没有往前看。现在看来，应用商店、PC、传统的搜索引擎业务等都是过渡战场，他们还是太迷恋旧的战场或者旧的事物。现在也是一样，他们倒回来跟头条竞争，可能会影响看新事情的注意力。”
"In the beginning, each company was competing in some old battlefields or transitional sites and didn't look forward. Now it seems that the APP stores, the PC, the traditional search engine business, etc.
are all transitional battlefields, and they are too obsessed with the old battlefields or old things. It's the same now. They're turning back to compete with Toutiao, and this may attract their attention on viewing new things."
我认为未来一定会变成虚拟视频社交的时代，虚拟人物在虚拟世界里沟通，类似电影《头号玩家》，Facebook早在2014年就以20亿美元收购了Oculus，在2017年推出了Facebook Space，一款与朋友一起在虚拟空间中使用的VR应用程序。
I think the future will definitely turn into the era of virtual video social network where virtual characters communicate in a virtual world, which is similar to the movie "Ready Player One." Facebook acquired Oculus for $2 billion back in 2014 and launched Facebook Space in 2017, which is a VR app to use with friends in a virtual space.
虽然目前VR和AR在大众之中还没有普及开来，但完全没有普及并不是视频社交本身的问题，而是基础设施还不够全面，而且缺少像移动互联网时代微信这种杀手级应用，而且我们主要的交互设备手机还不够给力。
VR and AR are not widespread among the general public,t this is not a problem with video socialization per se, rather a lack of infrastructure and a lack of a dominant app like WeChat in the mobile internet era. Plus, our main interaction device, the mobile phone, is still not powerful enough.
如果过渡到虚拟视频社交的时代，天然过度更近的方式是抖音快手这种视频平台，而不是像微信这种以语音文字图片为主导的聊天工具，再加上腾讯在社交上不断流失年轻一代用户，这也是我说腾讯危机的重要原因。
If the transition to the era of virtual video social network, the natural transition is using a video platform like TikTok or Kuaishou rather than a chat tool like WeChat, which is dominated by voice, texts, and pictures. Plus, Tencent is continually losing young generation users on social networking, and this also contributes to Tencent's crisis that I mentioned.
腾讯当年砍掉了腾讯微博，日活曾经达到8700万，虽然相比微博没有抓住明星资源，但有大量的小镇青年，移动互联网的下半场无论是拼多多还是快手，都是从下沉市场起家，但腾讯放弃了腾讯微博，也放弃了这些小镇青年，而且腾讯目前只能靠入局拼多多和快手去制衡阿里，其实如果当年腾讯微博没有放弃这些小镇青年用户，而不是把电商押宝在被投资的京东和拼多多，或者短视频集中在腾讯微博上去尝试，目前腾讯可能也不会这么被动。
Tencent dropped Tencent Weibo back then, which had a daily activity of 87 million. Not capturing celebrity resources as Weibo did, but there are small-town youths. In the second half of the mobile internet competition, Pinduoduo and Kuaishou both started from a sinking market. But Tencent gave upon Tencent Weibo and also these small-town youths.
And now, Tencent is only able to counterbalance Alibaba by investing in Pinduoduo and Kuaishou. In fact, if Tencent Weibo hadn't given up on these small-town young users back then, instead of betting on e-commerce by investing in Jingdong and Pinduoduo, or trying out short videos on Tencent Weibo,Tencent probably won't be so passive at present.
但历史无法假设，头条的产品负责人陈林曾评价：
But history cannot be assumed. Chen Lin, head of product at Toutiao, once commented:
“砍掉腾讯微博和微视，是腾讯犯下的两个大错。” "Dropping Tencent Weibo and Weishi are two big mistakes Tencent made."
我表示赞同。
And I agree.
做个小结，今天我讲了：
To make a recap, I covered the following points today:
1、腾讯垄断了什么？
2、腾讯没垄断什么？
3、腾讯以后还会垄断吗？
1、What does Tencent monopolize?
2、Tencent did not monopolize what?
3、Will Tencent monopolize on anything in the future?
04 我的价值观
讲完了腾讯，接下来又到了我最想跟你们说的：我的价值观。
Having talked about Tencent, it's time for what I want to talk to you about most: my values.
我的“同路人”观众们知道我在前几集视频里讲到了辩证法，说白了就是“随我反驳”，或者叫“我当我自己的杠精”，那今天我就再自己杠自己一回：我在本集视频里聊了那么多腾讯垄断的问题，其实意义不大，我也希望你用张小龙的名言去看DannyData的视频：
My fellow viewers know that I talked about dialectics in the last few episodes. To put it bluntly, "refute as I wish", or "I refute myself". So today I'll refute myself once again: I talked so much about Tencent's monopoly in this episode. in fact, it's not very meaningful. And I also hope that you can take Zhang Xiaolong's famous words to watch DannyData's video:
“我所说的都是错的。” "What I've said is all wrong."
其实我希望大家不要去过度关注“腾讯垄断”的问题，因为说实话，作为一个年轻人，无论你是批判“腾讯垄断”还是支持“腾讯垄断”，与其关注国内这些互联网巨头是否垄断，还不如多关注他们在成为巨头后，在承担社会责任、投资基础科学研究、探索尖端科技上都做了什么。
In fact, I hope that we do not pay excessive attention to the issue of monopoly. To be honest, as a young person, it doesn't matter whether you are for or against Tencent's monopoly.
Instead of focusing on whether the domestic Internet giants are monopolies, more attention should be paid on what they have done after becoming giants in taking social responsibility, investing in basic scientific research and exploring cutting-edge technologies.
马化腾：“虽然（中国）现在有讲新四大发明，讲移动支付在全球很领先，但现在我们一看，这些还都只是科技的应用，你回归到基础的科学研究来说，整个中国基础还是非常薄弱的。”
Ma Huateng:"Although (China) is now talking about the new Four Great Inventions and how the mobile payment is leading the world, if we take a look at them and we will find that these are still just the application of science and technology. The fundamental scientific research in China is still very weak."
腾讯是否垄断或者是否通过一些不正当手段限制竞争，这个有国家去操心，不用我们去操心，况且我们操心也改变不了什么，还不如去多操心一些我们能去改变的事。
Whether Tencent is a monopoly or whether it restricts competition through some unfair means is a matter for the country to worry about not for us. Besides, we can't change anything by worrying about it, so we might as well worry more about what we can change.
比如“看大，看小”，
Like "looking for a bigger picture, look at a small point."
说白了就是要用更广阔的眼光去看世界，也要紧盯眼前更重要的事。
Put simply, viewing the world with vision while focusing on important matters at present.
先说“看大”，我们总是紧盯腾讯是否在中国市场垄断了，还不如去关注一些更大的事情。
"Looking for a bigger picture" means that instead of always focusing on whether Tencent is a monopoly in the Chinese market, we might as well focus on something bigger.
比如我们总关注富豪的儿子又开了几辆豪车、泡了几个网红，却忽视今年诺贝尔奖获得者又提出了哪些可能影响世界的理论。
For example, we may always focus on how many more luxury cars a rich man's son drives and how many hot girls he picks up, while ignore the worldwide influential theories proposed by this year's Nobel Laureates.
我们总关注快递和外卖的速度能否再快点，却容易忽视硬核科技如航天、芯片等发展速度；
We may always focus on whether the speed of delivery and takeaways can get any faster, but we tend to overlook the speed of development of hardcore technologies, such as aerospace and chips.
我们总关注一辆汽车的内饰是否豪华、做工是否粗糙、百公里加速是否又提高了一秒，却容易忽视未来真正的核心竞争力自动驾驶、万物互联的发展速度；
We may always focus on whether the interior of a car is luxurious, whether the workmanship is rough, or whether the 100 km/h acceleration has improved by a second, but we tend to neglect the true core competencies of the future: the development speed of autonomous driving and the Internet of Everything.
说完了“看大”，再说“看小”。
That's that for "looking for a bigger picture". Let's move on to "looking at a small point"
与其盯着腾讯又在哪个领域垄断了，还不如去看看眼前有哪些机会避开巨头垄断的领域，当年腾讯不也是从移动梦网的垄断中闯出来的吗？我们要抓住新技术变革的机会，避开巨头的锋芒，也就是我之前所说的看准“易改变、难垄断”的机会。
Instead of focusing on the field in which Tencent has monopolized, it is better to see what opportunities are in front of you that can avoid the giant monopoly.Didn't Tencent also break out of the Mobile Dream Network monopoly?
We need to seize the opportunity of the new technological revolution, avoiding the giants. And this is what I said before, to find the"easy to change, hard to monopolize" opportunity.
当然，光看肯定是不够的。看准了机会，更重要的是去行动。
Of course, finding it is not enough. What's more important is to take action after finding the right opportunity.
曾经有位哲人说过：“键盘侠才喜欢抱怨，牛人已经看准方向并行动了。”
As a philosopher once said:"Keyboard warriors like to complain, the great warriors have seen and acted on the right direction."
好吧，我承认这位哲人就是我自己，吹牛不是我的重点，重点是我想让大家记住：
Well, sorry, that philosopher is me. Bragging is not my point, the point is that I want you to remember：
好点子+不行动=0
Great idea + No Action = 0
正如我喜欢的一句耐克广告词：Just do it. 干就完事儿了。
Just as a Nike slogan that I like: Just do it. Yes, let's just do it.
除了"看大，看小"，Just Do It，最后我认为还有非常重要的一点，那就是保持一个平和的心态去思考、去做事，避免过于激烈的情绪，甚至产生愤怒，因为愤怒并不能帮我们解决问题，就像电影《三块广告牌》里告诉我们的：
In addition to "looking for a bigger picture, look at a small point" and "Just Do It". Finally, I think it's very important to keep thinking and taking actions in a peaceful manner and avoid intense emotions and even anger. Anger does not help us solve problems, as the movie "Three Billboards Outside Ebbing, Missouri" tells us.
“愤怒只能产生更多愤怒。"
“Anger begets more anger.”
我是小丹尼，谈车说科技。下集视频我会讲阿里，你想听我讲点什么呢？欢迎给我留言，别忘了帮我分享，Techs Never Die，回见。
I‘m Danny. I talk about tech and cars. In the coming episode, I'll talk about Alibaba. What do you what to know? Please leave your comments. Don't forget to give me a "LIKE" and subscribe to my channel. Techs Never Die, see you next time.
文稿/配音 | 小丹尼
校对修改 | Emma、SE、Vivian、Xuyang、Scode
剪辑/视觉 | 罗兆吉、小丹尼、Alex、忠彦、新茹、雷杰、吕晓彬、马晓羽、蔡庆俊
翻译 | Xuyang、嘉瑶、杨墨、施震、Zelda
排版 | 李扁担、Xuyang
