新發展階段對債券市場服務實體經濟、防範化解金融風險、支持金融改革開放提出了更高要求,債券市場需要進一步提升市場效率,促進融資投資、資源配置、價格發現、政策傳導等市場功能充分發揮。本文從市場效率視角對我國債券市場在發行、交易、登記託管、信息披露、行業標準建設等方面的實踐經驗與存在的問題進行分析,並提出制度與技術層面的優化建議。

關鍵詞

市場效率  中央登記託管機制  標準化

中國債券市場已發展成爲全球第二大債券市場,成爲全球金融市場的重要一極。我國債券市場機制在部分領域已達到國際先進水平,如透明高效的中央登記託管體系、確定性最強的券款對付(DVP)結算機制、日益成熟的中國債券收益率曲線等。在步入高質量發展新階段後,爲更好地服務實體經濟發展和金融改革開放,債券市場需要充分發揮融資投資、資源配置、價格發現、政策傳導等功能。市場功能的發揮依賴於高效運行。未來應傳承寶貴歷史經驗,破解現存障礙問題,從發行、交易、登記託管、信息披露、行業標準建設等維度創新優化債券市場機制,推動市場效率再上臺階,以高效運行促進高質量發展。

債券市場需要邁向更高質效

自1981年國債恢復發行以來,經過40多年的發展探索,我國債券市場取得了巨大成就。金融基礎設施建設不斷加強,債券品種不斷豐富,市場參與主體更加多元,規模持續增長,交易結算日趨活躍,流動性不斷提高,對外開放不斷加快。

隨着國民經濟快速發展、外部環境深刻變化、金融改革開放持續推進,新發展階段對債券市場服務實體經濟、防範化解金融風險、支持金融改革開放提出了更高要求。債券市場需要更加充分地發揮融資投資、資源配置、價格發現、政策傳導等功能。金融市場功能的實現程度依賴於市場效率,效率越高,功能越能充分發揮。因此,立足新發展階段,適應新機遇、新要求,債券市場發展要在拓展規模的同時,努力挖掘深度,切實提質增效,市場效率應成爲新階段的發展方向和機制優化的着力點。

一般來說,一個高效率的債券市場應具備如下特徵:一是運行快捷穩健,即債券的發行交易能夠以最短時間、最低成本,安全、及時、有效地達成,市場具備活力和流動性,基礎設施高效強健;二是信息披露透明,即債券信息能夠及時、完整、準確地對外披露,並通過數字化的載體或格式便利市場主體操作;三是標準化治理,即債券業務有統一的監管規範和完備的行業標準指引,市場環境公平公正;四是價格傳導通暢,即債券價格的變化能夠及時充分反映宏觀經濟形勢變化,引導金融資源配置。

爲此,可基於上述維度,總結傳承我國債券市場的寶貴實踐經驗,着力解決現存問題和障礙,促進市場更加高效安全運行。

我國債券市場效率提升的實踐成就

得益於制度體系的不斷完善以及金融基礎設施的強力支持,我國債券市場建設取得了令人矚目的成就,多項安排全球領先,債券市場效率顯著提升。

(一)金融基礎設施支持市場高效穩健運行

一是DVP結算機制保障債券結算交易安全高效。2004年,中央結算公司中央債券綜合業務系統與央行大額支付系統互聯對接,建成全額實時的DVP結算機制。目前,銀行間債券市場二級市場已全面實現使用央行貨幣的DVP結算機制,消除了債券交易中的結算本金風險,同時通過債券自動質押融資等機制爲支付系統的穩定高效運行提供有力保障。這是中國金融基礎設施達到國際先進水平的主要標誌之一。

二是中央登記託管制度夯實債市高效運行的基礎。中央登記託管是指中央託管機構(CSD)依據法律或中央政府部門授權,同時履行對債券的中央登記和中央託管職能,實現債券中央登記和中央託管的一體化,使得債券權益的轉移、維護和管理僅通過中央登記託管機構的賬戶體系即可完成,債券交收和變更登記同時發生,具有法律關係清晰、穿透性強的特點,能夠有效提升交易結算的安全性和效率。中國債券市場曾因分散託管和缺乏統一登記而經歷曲折發展階段。爲扭轉混亂局面,在充分結合國際經驗和國內現實的基礎上,中國債券市場於20世紀90年代建立了中央登記託管制度,成爲市場20多年來高效穩健運行的重要基石和基本保障。基於中央登記託管制度構建的全球通一級賬戶模式安全、高效、透明,成爲境外投資者進入中國債券市場的主渠道,全球通下境外機構持債量佔境外機構持債總量的75%。

目前中國債券市場的結算週期已較很多發達國家的債券市場更短,境內結算實現以T+0爲主、T+1爲輔,併爲跨境結算提供非標準化的靈活結算週期安排(T+N)。其中,全球通直接入市模式的結算週期主要集中在T+1,T+0、T+1結算的合計佔比超過60%;而在多級託管、間接入市的香港債券通模式下,結算週期明顯拉長,T+0、T+1合計佔比約爲38%,其中T+0僅佔0.57%。

(二)信息披露機制建設不斷完善

一是公司信用類債券信息披露制度趨於統一。2020年12月,人民銀行、國家發展改革委、證監會聯合發佈《公司信用類債券信息披露管理辦法》,統一了兩大信用債市場的信息披露制度,改善了此前不同券種信息披露要求不同的問題。2021年8月,人民銀行、國家發展改革委、財政部、銀保監會、證監會和外匯局聯合發佈《關於推動公司信用類債券市場改革開放高質量發展的指導意見》,提出分類趨同的原則,按照公開發行和非公開發行的分類標準逐步統一同類公司信用債相關規則,明確提出“着重對非公開發行公司信用類債券的發行轉讓、信息披露、投資者保護、法律責任等進行統一規範”。

二是綠色債券環境效益披露取得突破。近年來,我國綠色債券市場蓬勃發展,成爲推動綠色發展與低碳轉型的重要途徑。爲促進綠色債券環境效益信息披露,中央結算公司發佈“綠色債券環境效益信息披露指標體系”,引起市場廣泛關注,擬被深圳市地方金融監督管理局納入深圳市綠色金融指標體系的地區標準。中央結算公司已上線綠色債券環境效益信息披露門戶和綠色債券數據庫,可供用戶查詢、下載綠色債券環境效益信息數據、中債綠色債券指數和綠色債券相關政策要聞、研究成果。運用數字化技術構建統一的綠色債券環境效益信息披露平臺和數據庫,能夠較全面系統地量化債券募集資金對環境的貢獻,有助於督促發行人提高信息披露透明度、防止“漂綠”等行爲,幫助投資人降低甄別成本、提升投資效率,幫助政府部門更好地識別綠色債券、評估政策效果。

三是環境、社會和公司治理(ESG)評價體系積極推進。踐行可持續發展理念已成爲全球普遍共識,ESG評價作爲關注企業可持續經營能力的價值理念和評價標準,受到國內外投資者的廣泛關注,並在中國債券市場逐漸興起。隨着碳達峯、碳中和政策出臺,國內對ESG理念及其相關產品的關注度和需求與日俱增。中央結算公司結合國際主流框架方法,深度融合中國國情與市場特點,自主研發“中債ESG評價體系”,通過金融科技手段集成大量非結構化數據和另類數據,對債券發行主體的ESG信息進行全面採集分析,成爲首家實現中國債券市場公募信用債發行主體全覆蓋的ESG評價體系,涵蓋債券市場及上市公司主體共計8000餘家。中債ESG評價指標由環境績效(E)、社會責任(S)、公司治理(G)三項彙總而成,共包含二級指標14個,三級指標39個,底層計算指標160餘個。中債ESG評價體系的推出,填補了國內債券市場ESG評價的空白,爲引導和完善中國債券市場ESG評價體系與標準形成、引導企業可持續發展、提升ESG信息披露質量、保護債券投資者利益、推進債券市場ESG實踐與應用發展發揮了重要作用。

(三)兩項債券價格指標產品的行業標準發佈

在成熟的債券市場,統一精細的監管標準和業務規則是市場高效運行的重要基礎。在我國債券市場多頭監管格局下,推動市場重要業務規則標準化不但可以規範市場運行,提高市場效率,而且更有助於減少人治因素,提升監管效能。中央結算公司基於20餘年金融基礎設施發展實踐,構建了債券登記、估值、擔保品等領域的10餘項標準。其中,“債券價格指標產品描述規範”和“債券價格指標產品數據採集規範”已通過全國金融標準化技術委員會審查,作爲行業標準由中國人民銀行在2021年7月正式發佈,首次對債券價格指標產品的數據源採集和產品發佈兩個重要環節進行了統一規範。兩項行業標準的發佈有效提高了債券價格指標產品的基準性、公允性和產品質量,降低了定價系統建設成本,促進了債券市場數據共享。

(四)債券收益率曲線體系日趨完善

國債收益率曲線對貨幣政策響應迅速,是一國無風險利率的代表,是金融市場重要的定價分析和風險管理計量基準。黨的十八屆三中全會提出“健全反映市場供求關係的國債收益率曲線”,2020年中共中央、國務院發佈的《關於構建更加完善的要素市場化配置體制機制的意見》和《關於新時代加快完善社會主義市場經濟體制的意見》中均進一步提出“更好發揮國債收益率曲線定價基準作用”的要求。

自1999年中央結算公司發佈第一條人民幣國債收益率曲線以來,中國國債收益率曲線的編制發佈日趨成熟。自2014年起,財政部、人民銀行、銀保監會陸續在其網站發佈中央結算公司編制的國債收益率曲線。國債收益率曲線應用日益廣泛,被市場機構廣泛用於公允價值計量、交易定價參考和風險管理,在債券市場上發揮着重要作用。記賬式國債、地方政府債券在招標發行時採用中債國債收益率曲線作爲發行定價基準。2016年,3個月期中債國債收益率被納入特別提款權(SDR)利率籃子,爲境外央行類及商業機構投資中國債券市場提供定價參考,有效推動了人民幣納入SDR貨幣籃子的國際化進程。國債收益率曲線還被廣泛應用於銀行理財、信貸資產、信託產品及保險資管產品等非標準化債權類資產定價領域,並在商業銀行內部資金轉移定價(FTP)過程中發揮越來越重要的作用。

目前中債收益率曲線覆蓋了中國債券市場所有債券品種和信用級別,政策性金融債和信用債收益率曲線也在支持金融市場發展、暢通貨幣政策傳導方面發揮着積極應用。在政策性金融債收益率曲線方面,國家開發銀行、中國農業發展銀行和中國進出口銀行分別在其網站展示中債國開債收益率曲線、中債農發行債收益率曲線和中債進出口行債收益率曲線,作爲政策性金融債一級發行定價、二級市場交易的重要參考;中債國開債收益率曲線成爲部分浮動利率債券的基準利率,中債進出口行債收益率曲線被進出口銀行作爲無固定期限資本債券的基準利率;以中債國開債和農發債收益率曲線爲基礎計算的國開債和農發債估值成爲標準債券遠期產品的定價基準。在信用債收益率曲線方面,人民銀行和銀保監會在其網站發佈中債商業銀行普通債收益率曲線和中債中短期票據收益率曲線。信用債收益率曲線能夠及時、精確反映債券市場的動態變化,可以爲觀察貨幣政策向實體經濟傳導效果、預判宏觀經濟走勢、研究和制定宏觀經濟政策提供重要參考。

債券市場效率仍存提升空間

中國債券市場已進入新發展階段,爲全面提升市場效率,一些問題與挑戰亟待應對和解決,市場機制需要進一步健全。

(一)發行、交易機制有待完善

一是發行DVP結算機制尚未全面實現。2001年國際清算銀行(BIS)和國際證監會組織(IOSCO)聯合發佈的《證券結算系統推薦標準》(RSSS)提出“券款對付可以而且應該像用於證券二級市場交易一樣,用於證券的發行與兌付”。我國銀行間債券市場的交易市場已全面實現DVP結算,但一級市場的發行繳款還未明確規範採用DVP結算,未實現債券確權上市與資金交付同時進行,既影響債券發行效率,也存在一定違約風險。

二是國際證券識別編碼(ISIN)申請流程較長。ISIN是國際標準化組織制定的證券編碼標準。在債券市場,ISIN解決了跨場所債券的唯一識別問題,也是境外投資者識別境內債券的重要手段,對我國債券市場對外開放至關重要。目前我國債券市場ISIN的申請流程較長,大部分債券的ISIN獲准日滯後於起息日或上市日。

三是私募基金參與債券市場的比重偏低。我國正在統籌多層次債券市場建設,大力發展高收益債等創新工具。這需要培育風險偏好更爲多元化的投資者羣體,進一步激發市場創新活力。相關數據顯示,截至2021年末,在中國證券投資基金業協會備案的存續私募基金管理人共有24610家;而銀行間市場本幣市場成員中共有私募基金404家,反映私募基金參與債券市場的比重偏低。

四是金融機構投資債券存在評級限制。從現行政策要求以及金融機構內部管理機制來看,金融機構投資債券需滿足一定評級標準和要求。有關評級要求針對的是個券而不是組合,這在一定程度上影響了市場活力,也可能形成反向激勵,導致評級虛高問題。

五是銀行持債的差異化風險計提規定有待完善。銀行業金融機構資產端和負債端的債券規模已超過百萬億元。根據《商業銀行資本管理辦法(試行)》,商業銀行對我國其他金融機構債權和一般企業債權的風險權重均爲100%,對我國其他商業銀行債權的風險權重爲25%,對符合條件的微型和小型企業債權的風險權重爲75%,不利於深化對風險的差異化管理。

六是回購交易尚未對境外投資者全面放開。回購交易是投資者進行流動性管理的基本工具。對於境外投資者,目前銀行間債券回購業務僅允許境外央行類機構以及人民幣參加行、清算行參與,事實上注重資金及資產使用效率的境外資管機構更需要開展回購業務。此外,在操作上,目前境外機構參與境內回購業務仍需簽署銀行間市場交易商協會(NAFMII)發佈的回購主協議,未能與國際回購主協議通用,在一定程度上影響業務參與的積極性。

七是國債期貨市場參與機構數量和類型有限。目前我國國債期貨市場參與機構數量和類型有限,僅有五大國有商業銀行獲批,並受窗口制約。大部分商業銀行的利率風險對沖工具仍主要爲利率互換、債券遠期,缺少標準化工具。此外,國債期貨尚未對境外投資者放開,無法滿足其開展標準化利率風險對沖的需要。這既影響境外投資者進入中國債券市場的積極性,也導致境外投資者只能通過賣出現貨債券來管理風險敞口,帶來了一定的跨境資金流動風險。

(二)金融基礎設施佈局需要統籌優化

一是不透明的多級託管模式存潛在風險。中央登記託管結算制度設計是汲取我國債券市場發展經驗和教訓的結果,是監管部門智慧的結晶,是被實踐證明有效、兼具安全性與效率的模式,應堅定不移地貫徹落實,但目前仍存在一些模糊認識。比如,有觀點認爲,理財產品可以實行混同不透明賬戶的多級託管模式,而這蘊含着嚴重的系統性風險。此外,在境外投資者通過混同賬戶間接入市模式下,信息的真實性、完整性、及時性難以充分保證,監管難以有效穿透,也存在一定隱患。

二是登記託管機構碎片化。國際上,由統一後臺支持多元化前臺是通行模式。託管結算機構呈現集中統一趨勢,以確保交易前臺多而不亂,各國紛紛通過整合託管結算後臺達到促進市場要素自由流動、降低交易成本、提高市場效率的目的。同時,爲滿足複雜多樣的交易需求,國際上交易前臺呈現服務多元化特徵,且數量較多,競爭充分。我國債券市場登記託管結算基礎設施曾因治亂而統一,但近年來又出現一定程度的分散化。目前,債券市場3家登記託管結算機構按照券種和市場分別進行登記、託管和結算,造成了重複建設,在此基礎上的疊牀架屋增加了機構之間的溝通成本,加劇了債券市場分割,降低了安全性和效率。目前大多數國家設置了單一登記結算機構,全世界設有3家登記結算機構的只有中國、印度這兩個案例。與此同時,我國債券市場交易前臺相對集中,特別是場外市場的前臺發育不充分,數量較少,這與國際規律不符,也難以充分滿足各類參與者的多層次需求。

三是中央託管機構與中央對手方沒有完全隔離。債券中央託管機構與中央對手方的風險屬性不同,在絕大多數國家是相互獨立的法人實體。但國內部分金融基礎設施的中央對手方和中央託管機構職能混同,未能實現風險隔離。

(三)信息披露標準化、穿透性有待加強

一是公司信用類債券需要統一信息披露標準。我國公司信用類債券細分品種多,在銀行間市場和交易所都有交易,信息披露標準趨於統一但仍有不一致之處。爲減輕市場機構的操作負擔,簡化內部流程,提高信息披露效率,降低失誤率和操作風險,有必要積極推動實現公司信用類債券信息披露標準統一和數據共享。私募債公開披露信息較少,以及違約債信息披露缺失、不及時、不完整的問題也亟待解決。

二是資產證券化產品尚未實現穿透披露。近年來我國資產證券化(ABS)市場發行規模大幅增長,但二級市場流動性較低。其中一個主要原因就在於基礎資產信息披露不穿透,標準化水平較低,披露格式(PDF格式)不便抓取,導致投資者難以進行精準估值和風險分析,從而制約了投資意願。從國際經驗來看,美國的資產證券化市場構建了較爲成熟的穿透披露法規體系,通過上位法和規章條例明確要求對主要的六類ABS產品實行基礎資產逐筆披露,並基本實現了穿透披露與隱私保護的平衡。

(四)相關配套制度有待完善

一是評級機制有待優化。客觀公允的外部公開評級能夠便利債券市場投資者按照風險偏好甄別、選取投資標的,提升市場運行效率。一直以來,我國債券市場評級機構由發行人選擇,導致哪家評級機構評的級別高,發行人就選擇哪家評級機構, 影響了債券評級的公正性、獨立性。

二是現行稅收制度制約國債的流動性。在發達金融市場中,國債具有無信用風險以及流動性最強兩個特徵,國債收益率曲線也因此成爲金融市場的基準利率。而我國國債的流動性低於政策性銀行債的流動性,稅收因素可能是一大影響因素。我國對國債持有期間的利息收入免徵所得稅和增值稅,而對國債買賣價差形成的資本利得則不免稅。在這種制度下,爲了獲得最大稅收節約效應,商業銀行等金融機構主要出於配置目的大量投資國債並持有至到期,很少用於交易,從而影響了國債二級市場的活躍度和流動性。國際上,主要國家幾乎都對國債利息收入和資本利得徵稅。其中,美國對國債利息收入和資本利得均徵收聯邦稅,英國對居民企業投資者購買國債從雙重不徵稅演變爲雙重徵稅。

三是資管產品的稅收政策不統一。目前我國對公募基金的債券投資價差收入全部免稅,而對銀行理財管理人買賣債券獲得的價差收入徵收增值稅和企業所得稅。在此情況下,銀行理財面臨不同稅負待遇,可能爲降低交易成本、提高收益率而拉長投資期限,並傾向於通過定製一個公募基金或投資一個發起式基金來間接投資債券,從而實現避稅。這也在一定程度上影響了債券市場的運行效率和活躍度。

推動債券市場更高質量發展的建議

立足新發展格局,應堅持制度自信,傳承寶貴經驗,解決現存問題,進一步提升市場效率,推動債券市場向更加規範、更加透明、更加安全、更可持續、更高質量的方向發展。

(一)完善發行機制,推動範式升級

一是推動實現發行DVP結算。目前,銀行間債券市場已具備開展發行DVP結算的條件,中央結算公司具備系統功能,業務指引也已起草。建議監管部門批准並推動發行DVP機制落地,以提高債券發行效率與安全性。從二級市場DVP結算實踐來看,其經歷了從逐步試點到全面強制實施的過程。一級市場可在開展初期允許發行人自主選擇DVP結算方式,待條件成熟時再全面推行。

二是將第三方估值作爲發行定價的比較基準。經過長期培育發展,市場已推出了以中債估值爲代表的全面反映人民幣債券市場價格及風險狀況的基準價格指標體系,市場機構廣泛採用中債估值作爲二級市場交易的公允價值計量基準和交易偏離監測基準。建議將第三方估值比對機制推廣到一級市場,比如將中債各信用等級收益率曲線作爲債券發行定價比較基準,以識別異常定價,提升發行效率。特別是部分機構認購結構化發行的信用債,容易扭曲債券定價,壓低債券利率。建議通過第三方估值比對機制,及時識別機構自融行爲,督促信息披露,解決違規自融和低效發行問題。

三是提高ISIN申請效率。爲提高ISIN審覈效率,充分發揮ISIN編碼在債券全生命週期的作用,建議以系統對接方式提高申請效率,由ISIN編碼分配管理部門爲債券中央登記託管機構開立服務終端,並升級爲接口級。 

四是適度擴大國債發行規模。國債是金融市場發展的基石,在維護金融市場穩定、支持宏觀政策實施、提升市場定價效率等方面具有重要作用。國債也是境外投資者參與中國金融市場的首選投資標的,是金融開放以及人民幣國際化的重要支點。隨着中國金融改革開放的不斷深化,市場對國債的需求與日俱增。目前中國債券市場的國債規模比重偏低,絕對規模和相對規模與發達國家成熟市場相比都有較大差距。建議適度擴大國債發行規模,以更好地滿足宏觀調控、流動性管理以及金融市場開放發展需要。

(二)完善交易機制,提高市場流動性

一是允許合格私募基金參與債券市場。建議適度降低機構投資者入市的註冊資本金門檻,允許在中國證券投資基金業協會依法備案、通過託管行安排的私募基金進入銀行間市場,並通過承銷商(一級市場)、做市商(二級市場)進行交易,實現市場分層;同時,在中央登記託管機構直接開立債券賬戶,實現穿透監管。

二是激發市場主體交易動能。在國外成熟債券市場,做市商之間不能點擊成交。做市商互相點擊成交給其帶來了報價風險,影響交易的積極性。爲激發債券市場主體交易動能,建議明確做市商之間不能點擊成交,需通過經紀人或自行協商成交;央行應成爲“做市商的做市商”,助力市場流動性改善和做市商交易動能提升。

三是推動商業銀行風險資本精準計提。建議參照貸款五級分類差異化風險計提的方式,對銀行持有的其他金融機構和一般企業債權設置更加細分的風險權重。考慮到中債市場隱含評級是從市場價格信號和發行主體相關信息中提煉出的,能夠動態反映市場投資者對債券的信用評價,可研究推行與中債市場隱含評級掛鉤的差異化風險資本計提規則,通過高風險多計提、低風險少計提的方式,幫助銀行節約資本。對於採用內部評級或評級公司評級設置風險權重的銀行,建議採用中債市場隱含評級作爲比較基準,提升資本管理的可比性和公允性。

四是彈性調整金融機構投資債券的評級標準。爲提升金融機構參與債券市場的積極性,減少評級門檻“一刀切”的弊端,激發市場活力,建議對現有政策以及金融機構內部管理規定中的債券評級標準進行彈性調整。可考慮參考中債市場隱含評級,將對單隻債券的評級約束調整爲對所投資債券組合的評級約束,構建債券組合整體違約率的評分辦法以及投資標準。

五是對境外商業機構逐步放開回購交易。建議對境外商業機構全面放開回購業務,可先放開逆回購,在控制槓桿的情況下放開正回購,以促進流動性提升,回應投資者關切。同時,逐步解決國際通用回購協議和國內回購主協議的等效性問題,允許境外機構投資者參與銀行間債券市場回購時可自主選擇簽署回購交易主協議,例如國際通行的全球回購主協議(GMRA),便利其開展業務操作。在交易規則對接國際的同時,要將仲裁權和司法管轄權掌握在境內,以掌握對外開放的主動權。

六是有序推進國債期貨。國債期貨是利率風險對沖的重要工具,具有標準化、防範利率風險與流動性風險交叉傳染等優勢。商業銀行持債規模較大,利率風險對沖需求強烈,參與國債期貨市場有助於促進現貨市場平穩運行,提高金融體系的抗風險能力。建議抓緊推動已獲批銀行國債期貨業務落地,並適度擴大參與機構範圍,允許承擔做市商業務的商業銀行參與國債期貨,穩妥放開境外機構參與國債期貨,促進風險管理和期貨現貨聯動發展。

(三)發揮中央登記託管優勢,支持多層次債券市場建設

一是堅持中央登記託管制度。堅持中央登記託管制度的核心是要堅持“中央確權”和“穿透監管”,並對貫徹不到位的情況予以完善。比如,包括理財產品在內的資管產品投資債券都應在中央登記託管機構獨立開戶,而非僅開立混同賬戶。如此既可發揮強穿透管理優勢,防範挪用風險,又可提高結算效率,降低操作風險。對於境外投資者入市,如增加託管行模式,建議合理合規發揮託管行功能,在開立代理賬戶的同時,在總託管機構也爲終端投資者單獨開立債券託管賬戶,兼容穿透監管制度優勢和境外多級服務需求。

二是由統一後臺支持多元化前臺。爲滿足多層次債券市場建設需要,應通過多元化交易前臺滿足市場的流動性需求,同時通過集中化、一體化的登記託管結算後臺保證市場交易結算的安全性和效率。最簡明高效的互聯方案是統一互聯,即由一個債券中央託管機構對接多個交易前臺,其效率顯著高於多個託管後臺交叉開戶的安排。如堅持實施託管後臺交叉開戶,則必須遵循穿透原則和主場結算原則,由總登記託管機構爲終端投資者單獨開立債券賬戶,併爲投資者提供最終結算服務,以防範交叉開戶的潛在風險。

具體可推動建設交易多平臺、多窗口,包括銀行間市場和交易所、銀登中心和保交所、區域交易中心,以及櫃檯等多個層次,使其各有側重,互爲補充,適當競爭。同時,推動債券中央託管結算機構與多交易前臺直聯,以低成本高效地支持投資者跨市場交易。具體可借鑑2014年平安銀行1號小額消費貸款資產支持證券的經驗,先行實施中央結算公司與交易所前臺直連,推動實現債券跨市場互聯。此外,推動託管結算後臺有機統籌整合,在專業分工的基礎上,實現股債分開,中央託管機構和中央對手方職能分開。進一步可整合形成功能齊全、風控有力、治理完善、國際領先的國家金融基礎設施集團。

(四)加強信息披露,提高穿透化標準化水平

一是推動公司信用類債券信息披露標準統一和數據共享。建議以實現存續期信息披露的“一次編輯、一次上傳、多方共享、多平臺披露”爲最終目標分步推進。第一步,先在單個券種內實現,如實現企業債市場在中央結算公司、滬深交易所的標準統一和數據共享。第二步,實現企業債和非上市企業公司債的標準統一和數據共享。最後一步,推動實現企業債、公司債和債務融資工具等整個公司信用類債券市場的標準統一和數據共享。可考慮推動成立公司信用類債券信息披露標準委員會,所有平臺共同參與制定信息披露行業標準,共商標準應用和更新事宜,確保標準同步更新和長期統一。在系統建設方面,短期建議將審覈受理系統作爲單個券種存續期信息披露系統,由受理審覈機構將信息披露文件共享給其他披露平臺。以企業債爲例,發行人將可擴展商業報告語言(XBRL)格式信息披露文件上傳給中央結算公司,中央結算公司根據跨市場情況同步推送至滬深交易所。中長期建議推動建立跨券種的共享信息披露機制,實現所有公司信用類債券發行人在一個信息披露系統上報送XBRL格式文件,系統根據發行人的發債類型和跨市場情況,自動將文件推送給其他信息披露平臺。爲進一步便利發行人參與,降低信息披露平臺對紙質蓋章頁的依賴程度,建議共享信息披露系統可同時對發行人和主承銷商開放,支持有能力、有意願的發行人自主上傳信息,以身份識別代替蓋章等繁瑣流程。主承銷商可查閱發行人上傳的文件,對文件內容和上傳時效進行確認並承擔連帶責任。

二是完善私募債信息披露。爲進一步提升私募債信息披露質量,建議在未來制定的公司債券管理條例等規則中推動私募債信息披露標準統一。具體包括:私募債發行主體應參照《公司信用類債券信息披露管理辦法》的相關要求,及時披露發債企業最近三年經審計的財務報告及最近一期會計報表、募集說明書、信用評級報告等;參照《公司信用類債券信息披露管理辦法》的相關要求,在債券存續期內按時披露定期報告;在私募債發行結束後及時披露發行結果公告,內容包括但不限於當期債券的計劃發行總額、實際發行總額、發行利率、發行價格、投資申購家數、合規及有效申購家數、最高及最低申購利率等信息;發行人通過權威渠道以標準化形式披露信息,可使用Excel或參照XBRL格式,按照標準化、電子化格式,及時、全面地披露財務信息。

三是加強違約債信息披露。建議推動完善違約債信息披露。具體包括:加強債券發生違約的信息披露,發行人及中介機構應及時、準確地披露債券違約信息,特別是違約本息金額等重要信息;對於進入破產訴訟程序的違約債發行人,建議加強對重整計劃、和解計劃等重要文本的披露;對於依據重整計劃將債券對應債權留債處置的,以及自籌資金或引入戰略投資者償付違約債的,應及時披露相關償付、履約情況,在償付完畢或未能履約時,應及時披露相關信息;加強對違約債發行人定期財務報告的信息披露。

四是推動ABS底層資產信息穿透式、標準化披露。我國銀行間市場的信貸資產證券化起步較早,信息披露規則更加完善,產品特徵與美國等成熟ABS市場最爲接近,並且信息登記制實現了對基礎資產的穿透登記,提升了底層數據的標準化水平,爲推動基礎資產信息逐筆披露創造了條件。建議推動信貸ABS產品入池資產重要信息的逐筆、標準化披露,爲投資者和第三方估值機構提供充分的風險評估和決策參考,促進信息對稱,激發市場活力。在法律層面,研究推動在資產證券化上位法中對信息穿透披露作出統領式規定,確立信息穿透披露的法律基礎和監管依據,並解決與隱私保護相關的法律衝突問題。在制度層面,初期可對自願逐筆披露的發起機構給予激勵政策,比如放開發行規模限制、享受利率優惠等;待市場接受度提高後,再就各類產品的基礎資產逐筆披露要求出臺製度規範。在操作層面,中央結算公司聯合多家專業機構,在對中美資產支持證券信息披露比較研究的基礎上,起草了信貸ABS資產逐筆信息披露標準,充分考慮了好用性、便利性以及對底層資產借款人隱私的保護,成爲業內共識。可參考該標準持續完善信息登記要素,提供數據查詢服務,最終逐步推動實現公開披露。

(五)推動債市標準升級,健全行業標準體系

《國家標準化發展綱要》要求進一步加強標準化工作,充分釋放市場主體標準化活力,大幅提升市場自主制定標準的比重。爲深入貫徹《國家標準化發展綱要》精神,應加快構建專業精細的債券市場行業標準體系。我國債券市場40多年的發展實踐取得了多項歷史性突破,多項安排全球領先。對於在實踐中已被反覆驗證先進合理、具有國際領先水平的標準應積極推動升級爲行業標準。

建議推動“綠色債券環境效益信息披露指標體系”升級爲行業標準,探索在粵港澳大灣區的試點應用並逐步推廣,適時推動納入相關國際標準議程;推動中債ESG評價體系成爲債券市場ESG評價行業標準,鼓勵債券市場ESG評價分析工具與數據庫建設;以中央結算公司起草的“債券擔保品管理技術指南”“債券發行招標與中標處理規範”“固定收益證券價格指標計算方法規範”“收益率曲線和債券估值編制規範”“固定收益證券登記要素”“固定收益證券本金償付規範”等爲基礎,推動債券市場行業標準體系建設。

(六)深化債券收益率曲線應用,豐富政策工具

一是創新國債收益率曲線在債券市場的應用。建議創新、豐富以國債收益率爲定價基準的金融產品,包括髮行以短期國債收益率爲定價基準的浮動利率國債、開發以國債收益率爲標的的金融衍生品等。

二是推動擴大收益率曲線作爲定價基準的應用範圍。建議擴大國債收益率的定價基準範圍,逐步覆蓋其他債權、股權、衍生品等債券之外的金融資產,促進利率在整個金融市場中的有效傳導。考慮到債券收益率期限結構完整且連續性強,可研究探索在貸款市場報價利率(LPR)基礎上將國債、信用債等債券的收益率曲線也納入貸款定價基準參考。

三是進一步擴大國債收益率在政策和市場中的應用。10年期國債收益率與潛在經濟增長率之間的關係較爲穩定,可將10年期國債收益率作爲重要政策參考目標以及貨幣政策適度性的衡量指標。公開市場操作、國庫現金管理以及市場交易中的債券回購、債券借貸均涉及擔保品管理,建議基於國債收益率形成的估值,實施逐日盯市,充分發揮國債收益率曲線的基準作用。隨着中國國債規模的擴大和國債流動性的改善,適時重啓公開市場現券交易,有利於更好發揮國債收益率的定價基準作用,提高政策傳導效率,改善國債市場的流動性。

(七)優化評級、稅收機制,完善政策配套措施

一是探索“發行人付費、投資者選擇”安排。爲提高評級的公平性和獨立性,當務之急是要將評級機構選擇權交給投資人。而如採取投資者付費模式,將存在一定問題,主要包括:不同投資人購買不同評級機構產品將增加溝通障礙和交易成本;如購買評級的投資者較少,可能影響債券的流動性;發行人配合度較低,提供的信息可能存在不客觀、不及時、不全面等問題;難以完全解決利益衝突問題,投資者和中介機構之間也可能存在利益關聯。因此,建議探索實行“發行人付費、投資者投票選擇”機制,即評級費用仍由發行人支付,但由投資者投票選擇評級機構。這一方面可以通過制度切斷髮行人和評級機構之間的利益關聯,緩解利益衝突,提高評級機構服務的客觀中立性;另一方面也可利用傳統的發行人付費模式的規模效應,提高債券市場運行效率。對於會計師事務所和律師事務所的選擇,也可探索“發行人付費、投資者投票”的機制安排。

二是優化國債利息和資本利得稅收安排。建議優化國債稅收制度,對國債利息和資本利得均徵稅或均不徵稅,以提升市場主體交易的積極性,提高國債市場的流動性,消除由利息免稅導致的定價扭曲效應,更好地發揮國債收益率曲線定價基準作用。

三是推動理財與公募基金稅收政策統一。隨着公募基金和銀行理財在各項監管指標上逐漸拉平,建議推動銀行理財可享受與公募基金同等的稅收政策。

To Promote Institutional Construction and Enhance Bond Market Performance Quality

Feng Yuan, Li Bo

Abstract

The new phase of development places higher requirements for the bond market to serve the real economy, forestall and defuse financial risks and support financial reform and opening up. The bond market should be more efficient in promoting financing, investment, resource allocation, price discovery and policy transmission. From the perspective of market efficiency, this paper analyzes the good practices and existing problems in China’s bond market in terms of issuance, trading, registration, depository, information disclosure and industry standards, and provides suggestions for improvements at institutional and technical levels.

Keywords

Market efficiency, central registration and depository, standardization

China’s bond market has developed into the world’s second largest and an important part in the global financial market. China’s bond market mechanism has been world-leading in some areas, such as the transparent and efficient central registration and depository system, the delivery versus payment (DVP) settlement with the highest level of certainty and the increasingly mature yield curves. In the new stage of high-quality development, the bond market should fully harness its function in financing and investment, resource allocation, price discovery and policy transmission to better serve the development of the real economy and the reform and opening up of the financial sector. To fully harness its function, the market must run efficiently. In the future, valuable experience should be carried forward to remove the existing obstacles and improve market mechanisms relating to issuance, trading, registration, depository, information disclosure and industry standards. In this way, we will push market efficiency to a higher level and pursue high-quality development through efficient operation.

The bond market should move towards higher quality and efficiency

Since the resumption of the Chinese government bond (CGB) issuance in 1981, China’s bond market has made great achievements over the past four decades, such as stronger financial infrastructure, a wider range of bond varieties and greater diversity of market participants in an expanding market that is more active, more liquid and opening up at a faster pace.

In the context of China’s fast-growing national economy and ongoing financial reform and opening up in a world undergoing profound changes, the new phase of development places higher requirements for the bond market to serve the real economy, forestall and defuse financial risks and support financial reform and opening up. The bond market should fully harness its function in financing and investment, resource allocation, price discovery and policy transmission. How well the financial market functions depends on market efficiency. The higher the efficiency, the better the market functions. To get poised for new opportunities and meet new requirements in the new stage of development, therefore, the bond market should, while growing in size, go deeper in efforts to boost quality and efficiency. Market efficiency should be the focus of development and optimization in the new development stage.

Generally speaking, an efficient bond market should have the following characteristics: (1) swift and steady operation. The bond issuance and trading can be completed safely, timely and effectively in the shortest time and at the lowest cost, and the market is active and liquid with efficient and robust infrastructure; (2) transparent disclosure. The bond information can be disclosed in a timely, complete and accurate manner, with accessible digital carriers or formats; (3) standardized governance. The bond business is governed by unified regulatory norms and a full set of industry standards and guidelines, which ensure that the market environment is fair and just; and (4) unimpeded price transmission. The bond prices can price in macroeconomic changes in a timely manner to guide the allocation of financial resources.

Based on the above dimensions, therefore, we can summarize and carry forward the good practices and valuable experience gained in China’s bond market to solve the existing problems and obstacles, and to enhance market efficiency and safety.

China’s bond market achievements in efficiency enhancement

Thanks to the continuous improvement of the institutional system and the strong support from financial infrastructure, China has made remarkable achievements in its bond market, evidenced by a few globally leading arrangements and significantly enhanced efficiency.

i. Financial infrastructure support efficient and steady market operation

First, the DVP settlement mechanism ensures safe and efficient settlement.In 2004, the CCDC bond system was linked to the PBOC’s High Value Payment System (HVPS) to create a DVP mechanism featuring real-time gross settlement. At present, the inter-bank bond market has applied the DVP settlement mechanism to full scale in the secondary market, eliminating the principal risk. A strong guarantee is also provided for the payment system through automatic financing secured by bonds as collateral. This is one of the major indicators of China’s world-leading financial infrastructure.

Second, the central depository system has laid a solid foundation for an efficient bond market. Central depository service means that the central securities depository (CSD) functions as the central registry and central custodian of bonds in accordance with the law or upon authorization, thereby enabling the integration of central registration and central custody of bonds. Such integration enables the transfer, maintenance and management of bond entitlements through the CSD’s account system alone. Bond settlement and registration thereof occur simultaneously, ensuring clear legal relationships and transparency, as well as safety and efficiency. China’s bond market once experienced a bumpy road due to decentralized custody and registration. To eradicate the chaos, China established a central depository system for its bond market in the 1990s by adapting good international practices to its domestic reality. The system has become an important cornerstone for efficient and steady operation of the market for more than two decades. The CIBM Direct based on central depository is safe, efficient and transparent, and has become the main channel for foreign investors to access the Chinese bond market. The bond holdings of foreign institutions under CIBM Direct account for 75% of all foreign bond holdings in China.

At present, the settlement cycle in China’s bond market is shorter than that of many developed markets. Onshore settlement is mainly based on T+0, supplemented by T+1, with flexible settlement cycle arrangements (T+N) available for cross-border settlement. Under the CIBM Direct, most settlements are done on, with T+0 and T+1 settlements together accounting for 60% of total. Under the Bond Connect which is based on a multi-level account structure and indirect holding, the settlement cycle is significantly longer, with T+0 and T+1 together accounting for 38%, and T+0 alone taking up only 0.57%.

ii. The information disclosure mechanism kept improving

First, the information disclosure policies for corporate credit bonds are converging. In December 2020, PBOC, NDRC and CSRC jointly issued the Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure of Corporate Credit Bonds, unifying disclosure policies across the interbank market and the exchange. In August 2021, PBOC, NDRC, MOF, CBIRC, CSRC and SAFE issued the Guidance on Promoting High-quality Development in the Reform and Opening-up of the Corporate Credit Bond Market. The document established a principle of converging taxonomies. Specifically, the rules for corporate credit bonds of the same category will be gradually unified under the classification criteria for public offering versus non-public offering. The guidance underlines unification of the rules for corporate credit bonds offered in a non-public way in terms of issuance, transfer, information disclosure, investor protection and legal liabilities.

Second, breakthroughs have been made in the environmental impact disclosure of green bonds. Recent years have seen China’s green bond market thriving and lending a significant impetus to green development and low-carbon transition. To promote the environmental impact disclosure of green bonds, CCDC has created the Environmental Impact Disclosure Indicator System, which has got wide attention in the market and promises to be incorporated into the regional standards for Shenzhen’s green finance. CCDC has launched a web portal for green bond environmental impact disclosure and a green bond database. They allow users to search and download green bonds’ environmental impact data, the ChinaBond green bond indices and the green bond-related policy highlights and research findings. The unified environmental impact disclosure platform and database, based on digital technologies, can quantify the environmental contributions of bond proceeds in a comprehensive and systematic way, helping issuers boost the transparency of disclosures and prevent “greenwashing”, helping investors reduce screening costs and improve investment efficiency and helping government agencies better identify green bonds and assess policy effectiveness.

Third, the ESG evaluation system has been advanced. Pursuing sustainable development has become a global consensus. ESG evaluation, as a value concept and evaluation standard focusing on the sustainability of business operations, has received extensive attention from domestic and foreign investors, and is gradually gaining traction in China’s bond market. With the goals of carbon peak and carbon neutrality introduced, the attention and demand for the ESG philosophy and related products are increasing across China. CCDC has independently developed the ChinaBond ESG Evaluation System in line with the international mainstream methodologies and China’s market realities. The system has pooled non-structured data and alternative data using financial technologies. It is the first ESG evaluation system to achieve full coverage of publicly offered credit bond issuers in China’s bond market, covering over 8,000 bond market participants and listed companies. The ChinaBond ESG Evaluation consists of indicators for environmental performance (E), social responsibility (S) and corporate governance (G), which are further divided into 14 tier-two indicators, 39 tier-three indicators and more than 160 bottom-level indicators. The system, as the first of its kind in China’s bond market, plays a crucial role in the formation of the ESG evaluation and standards in China’s bond market, encouraging sustainable development of enterprises, improving the quality of ESG disclosure, protecting bond investors and promoting ESG practices.

iii. Release of two industry standards for bond pricing products

In a mature bond market, unified and fine-grained regulatory standards and business rules are an important foundation for efficient market operation. In China’s bond market overseen by a few regulatory authorities, the standardization of important business rules can not only bring discipline and higher efficiency to market operation, but also help improve the efficiency of supervision. Based on expertise as a financial market infrastructure for over 20 years, CCDC has established more than 10 standards for bond registration, valuation, collateral, etc. The Data Description Specification for Bond Pricing and Primary Data Collection Standards for Bond Pricing have passed the review of China Financial Standardization Technical Committee and been officially published as industry standards by PBOC in July 2021. The two sets standards have effectively heightened the status of bond pricing products as benchmarks with enhanced fairness and quality, bringing down the cost of pricing and promoting data sharing across the bond market.

iv. The bond yield curve system is becoming increasingly full-fledged

The government bond yield curve responds quickly to monetary policy, representing a country’s risk-free interest rate, and is an important benchmark for pricing analysis and risk management in financial markets. The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee called for “improving the government bond yield curve showing the relationship between market supply and demand”. In 2020, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued the Guidelines on Improving the Market-based Allocation Mechanism of Production Factors and the Guidelines on Accelerating the Improvement of the Socialist Market Economy System in the New Era, further laying stress on “better unleashing the pricing benchmark role of the government bond yield curve”.

Since the first ever RMB CGB yield curve was released in 1999, the CGB yield curve has become increasingly mature. Since 2014, the MOF, PBOC and CBIRC have successively published the CGB yield curve produced by CCDC on their websites. The CGB yield curve is used by market institutions in a growing range of scenarios, including fair value measurement, transaction pricing and risk management, playing a vital role in the bond market. It is also used as the pricing benchmark for book-entry CGB and local government bond in issuance. In 2016, the three-month ChinaBond Government Bond Yield was included in the special drawing rights (SDR) interest rate basket to provide pricing reference for foreign central banks and commercial institutions investing in the Chinese bond market, effectively promoting the RMB internationalization. In addition, the CGB yield curve is also used in pricing of non-standard debt assets, such as banking wealth management, credit assets, trust products and insurance asset management products, and plays an increasingly important role in the funds transfer pricing (FTP) process of commercial banks.

At present, the ChinaBond yield curves cover the full spectrum of bonds and credit ratings in China’s bond market. The yield curves of policy bank bonds and credit bonds also contribute to the development of financial markets and he transmission of monetary policies. As for the yield curve of policy bank bonds,China Development Bank (CDB), the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) and the Export-Import Bank of China (CEXIM) display the ChinaBond CDB Bond Yield Curve, the ChinaBond ADBC Bond Yield Curve and the ChinaBond CEXIM Bond Yield Curve on their respective websites, which are important pricing benchmarks for issuance and trading of policy bank bonds. The ChinaBond CDB Bond Yield Curve has become the benchmark rate for some floating-rate bonds. The ChinaBond CEXIM Bond Yield Curve has been taken by CEXIM as the benchmark rate for perpetual capital bonds. The valuations of CDB bonds and ADBC bonds calculated based on the ChinaBond CDB Bond Yield Curve and the ChinaBond ADBC Bond Yield Curve have become the pricing benchmark for standard bond forward contracts. As for credit bond yield curves, the PBOC and the CBIRC released the ChinaBond Financial Bond of Commercial Bank Yield Curve and the ChinaBond CP&Note Yield Curve on their respective websites. The credit bond yield curves can timely and accurately reflect the changes in the bond market, providing important reference for observing the monetary policy transmission to the real economy, predicting macroeconomic trends and formulating macroeconomic policies.

Bond market efficiency still has room for improvement

China’s bond market has entered a new stage of development. In order to improve the market efficiency in an all-round way, some problems and challenges should be addressed, and the market mechanism must be further improved.

i. The issuance and trading mechanism needs to be improved

First, DVP settlement has not been fully implemented in issuance. In 2001, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the International Organization for Securities and Futures Commissions (IOSCO) issued the Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems (RSSS), stating that DVP could and should be achieved for issuance and redemption of securities as well as for transactions in secondary markets. DVP has been fully achieved for trading in China’s inter-bank bond market, but it has not been designated as a standard method for payment for subscription in the primary market. The ownership confirmation and listing of bonds do not coincide with delivery of funds, which affects the efficiency and poses some default risk.

Second, it takes a long time to apply for the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN). ISIN is a securities coding standard formulated by the International Organization for Standardization. In the bond market, ISIN providers unique identifiers for cross-venue bonds, and is also an important tool for foreign investors to identify China’s bonds. It is crucial to the opening-up of China’s bond market. At present, the ISIN application process in China’s bond market is relatively prolonged. The approval date of most bonds come later than the value date or listing date.

Third, private funds have a low share in the bond market. China is making coordinated efforts to build a multi-level bond market and encouraging innovative instruments such as high-yield bonds. Thus it is necessary to further diversify the risk appetites of investors and give additional boost to market innovation. Data shows that as of the end of 2021, there were 24,610 outstanding private equity fund managers registered with the Asset Management Association of China (AMAC). However, there were only 404 private funds in the inter-bank bond market, indicating limited participation by private funds in the bond market.

Fourth, there are rating restrictions for financial institutions to invest in bonds. According to the current policies and the internal management mechanisms, financial institutions can only invest in bonds with certain ratings. The rating requirements are for individual bonds rather than a portfolio, which throttle the market vitality to a certain extent, and may also lead to inflated ratings.

Fifth, the risk allowances for banks’ bond holding have yet to be improved.Either asset or liability side of banking institutions’ balance sheet has registered over RMB100 trillion in bonds in aggregate. In accordance with the Capital Rules for Commercial Banks (Provisional), the risk weight of commercial banks’ claims on other financial institutions and general corporates is 100%, compared with a risk weight of 25% for claims on other commercial banks and 75% for claims on eligible micro and small enterprises, which is not conducive to differentiated management of risks.

Sixth, repurchase is not fully available to foreign investors. Repurchase is a basic tool for investors to manage their liquidity. For foreign investors, only foreign central bank, RMB participants and clearing banks are allowed to conduct repurchases in the interbank bond market. In fact, foreign asset managers that value the efficiency of funds and assets have stronger demand for repurchases. In addition, operationally, foreign institutions have to sign the master repurchase agreement published by the National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors (NAFMII), instead of the globally used GMRA, to engage in repurchase in China, which discourages participation.

Seventh, the number and types of institutions participating in the CGB futures market are limited. At present, the participants in China’s CGB futures market are limited in number and types. Approved participants are only the five major state-owned commercial banks, subject to window restrictions. Most commercial banks’ interest rate risk hedging instruments are still interest rate swaps and bond forwards, lacking standardized instruments. In addition, CGB futures are not available to foreign investors to meet their needs for standardized interest rate risk hedging. This not only affects foreign investors’ enthusiasm for the Chinese bond market, but also results in foreign investors having to manage their exposure by selling spot bonds, which brings certain risk in cross-border capital flows.

ii. Coordinated efforts needed to optimize the financial infrastructure

First, there are potential risks in the opaque multi-level depository model.The central depository-based settlement system was designed based on lessons learnt and experience gained by China in its bond market development, and on the wisdoms of regulatory authorities. It has proved to be effective, safe and efficient. It should be implemented unswervingly. However, there are still some ambiguities in understanding. For example, some argue that wealth management products can be managed in a multi-level depository model with omnibus accounts, which in fact poses serious systemic risks. In addition, when foreign investors indirectly enter the market through omnibus accounts, it is difficult to guarantee the authenticity, integrity and timeliness of information, and it is difficult to for regulators to see through.

Second, registration and depository institutions are fragmented. A common global practice is to support diverse trading venues with a single back office. The general trend for depository and settlement institutions is centralization, which ensures order among multiple front offices. Markets around the world have sought to consolidate their depository and settlement back-offices to boost free flow of market factors, reduce trading costs and raise market efficiency. Also, in order to meet complex and diversified trading needs, the front offices become diversified based on full competition. The registration, depository and settlement infrastructures in China’s bond market were once unified to address irregularities, but in recent years have gone fragmented to a certain extent. At present, the three registration, depository and settlement institutions in the bond market provide services for different types of bonds and markets separately, resulting in duplication of costs. The situation increases the communication costs between institutions, intensifies market fragmentation and hinders safety and efficiency. Now most markets have set up a single depository and settlement institution; only China and India each have in place three. Also, China’s bond market see front offices relatively concentrated. In particular, front offices in the over-the-counter market are under-developed and small in number. This is not in line with international practices and makes it hard to meet the multi-level needs of various participants.

Third, the CSD is not independent from the central counterparty (CCP). The CSD and the CCP take different risks and are legal entities independent from each other in most markets around the world. However, in China, the CSD and the CCP are not segregated in some financial infrastructure.

iii. Information disclosure should be further standardized and more transparent

First, information disclosure standards should be unified for corporate credit bonds. There are many kinds of corporate credit bonds in China, which are traded in the inter-bank market and on exchanges. The information disclosure standards tend to be uniform, but still show some inconsistencies. To ease the operational burden on market entities, simplify internal processes, boost the efficiency of disclosure and reduce the operational risk, it is necessary to unify the disclosure standards and promote data sharing of corporate credit bonds. What should be addressed urgently also include a low disclosure level of private placed bonds and the lack, delay or incompleteness of disclosure on defaulted bonds.

Second, see-through disclosure has not been realized for ABS. In recent years, China’s ABS market has expanded substantially in issuance scale, but the secondary market is low in liquidity. One of the main reasons goes to the lack of see-through disclosure of underlying assets, low level of standardization and difficulty in information capturing (as disclosures are often made in PDF). These problems prevent investors from precise valuation and risk analysis, becoming a major constraint on their desire to invest. From the perspective of international experience, the US ABS market has a well-established legal and regulatory framework for see-through disclosure, requiring asset-level disclosure of the six major categories of ABS products, while keeping a balance between see-through disclosure and privacy protection.

iv. Supporting systems can be improved

First, the rating mechanism needs to be refined. Impartial and fair external public ratings help investors identify and select investment targets suitable for their risk appetite, thus improving market efficiency. For a long time, rating agencies are chosen by issuers in China’s bond market. Issuers go for rating agencies that give higher ratings, undermining the impartiality and independence of bond ratings.

Second, the current tax regime restricts the liquidity of CGB. In developed financial markets, government bonds have no credit risk and the strongest liquidity, and, therefore, the government bond yield curve is the benchmark rate. In China, however, CGBs are less liquid than policy bank bonds, where the tax arrangements may be a major factor. In China, the interest income on CGB is exempted from income tax and value-added tax, but the capital gains from the bid-ask spreads are not tax-exempt. Under this regime, to obtain the maximum tax saving effect, commercial banks and other financial institutions tend to hold massive amounts of CGBs to maturity, instead of trading them, thus restricting the liquidity of CGBs. Major markets around the world do levy taxes on the interest income and capital gains on government bonds. The US levy federal tax on both interests and capital gains on Treasury bonds, while the UK changed from double non-taxation to double taxation on the purchase of government bonds by resident corporate investors.

Third, the tax policies for asset management products are inconsistent. At present, the income from the spreads on bonds is exempted from tax for public offered funds, but is subject to value-added tax and corporate income tax for bank wealth management products. Therefore, to reduce costs and raise returns, the bank wealth managers tend to lengthen the investment term, and invest in bonds indirectly through a tailor-made public offered fund or investing in a sponsored fund for tax evasion purposes. This dampens the efficiency and activity of the bond market to some extent.

Suggestions on promoting higher-quality development of the bond market

Under the new development pattern, we should stay confident in the system and carry forward valuable legacy to solve the existing problems, and to pursue a better future of the bond market with a higher level of efficiency, standardization, transparency, safety, sustainability and quality.

i. Improve the issuance mechanism and upgrade the paradigm

First, DVP should be used in bond issuance. At present, the inter-bank bond market is well-equipped for DVP settlement in issuance. CCDC has the technical system as well as drafted business guidelines in place. It is suggested that the regulatory authorities approve and promote the use of DVP in issuance, so as to raise security and efficiency. DVP practices in the secondary market have experienced a transition from pilot implementation to full-scale mandatory use. The primary market may allow the issuers to choose DVP at their discretion in the early stage, and then implement the mechanism market-wide when conditions permit.

Second, third-party valuation should be used as the benchmark for issue pricing. After cultivation and development over a long period of time, the market has had a set of benchmark price indicators that provide a full picture of the market price and risk status of RMB bonds, represented by ChinaBond Valuation. Market entities have adopted ChinaBond Valuation as the benchmark for fair value measurement and for monitoring deviation of transaction prices in the secondary market. It is suggested that the third-party valuation comparison mechanism be extended to the primary market. For example, the ChinaBond yield curve for each credit rating can be used as the benchmark for bond issue pricing to detect abnormal pricing and raise issuance efficiency. In particular, some institutions subscribe for credit bonds issued in a structured fashion, which tends to distort bond pricing and depress yields. It is suggested that the third-party valuation comparison mechanism be used to detect self-financing promptly, urge information disclosure and address the problem of self-financing and issuance inefficiency.

Third, the application process for ISIN should be more efficient. To improve the efficiency of ISIN application and give full play to the role of ISIN through the lifecycle of the bonds, it is proposed to improve the application efficiency by means of system interfacing. The ISIN allocation manager may open a service terminal for the CSD and upgrade it to the interface level.  

Fourth, the size of CGB issuance should be expanded moderately. CGB is the cornerstone of China’s financial market development, playing a central role in maintaining financial market stability, supporting the implementation of macro policies and boosting the efficiency of market pricing. CGB is also the preferred target for foreign investors seeking an exposure to China’s financial market, and an anchor for financial openness and RMB internationalization. The market demand for CGB keeps expanding as China is going deeper in its financial reform and opening up. At present, CGB represents a relatively small share in China’s bond market, showing a big gap with developed markets in either value or share. It is suggested to expand the CGB issuance scale moderately to better meet the needs of macro-control, liquidity management and the opening-up and development of the financial market.

ii. Improve the trading mechanism and enhance the market liquidity

First, qualified private placed funds should be allowed to access the bond market. It is suggested to lower the registered capital threshold for institutional investors to enter the market, to allow private placed funds registered with the AMAC to access the interbank market through a custodian bank and trade through underwriters (primary market) and market makers (secondary market) to form a tiered market. In addition, they should be allowed to open bond accounts directly with the CSD to enable see-through supervision.

Second, market entities should be encouraged to trade. In mature bond markets, the click-to-trade model is prohibited between market makers. Market makers clicking on each other to clinch a deal will bring them a quotation risk, discouraging trading. For bond market participants to be motivated to trade, it is suggested to explicitly ban click-to-trade deals between market makers and require them to trade via brokers or directly through negotiation. The central bank should become a “market maker for market makers” to help improve liquidity and motivate market makers to trade.

Third, risk provisions for commercial banks should be improved. It is suggested to increase the granularity of risk weights for banks’ claims on other financial institutions and general corporates with reference to the risk provision differentiation based on five-category loan classification. Since the ChinaBond Market-Implied Ratings (MIR) is a credit rating derived from market price signals and issuer information to dynamically reflect investors’ evaluation of bond creditworthiness, it is suggested to make differentiated risk provision rules linked to the ChinaBond MIR, thus helping banks save capital by aligning capital provision with risk level. For banks that use internal ratings or third-party ratings to set risk weights, it is suggested to use ChinaBond MIR as a benchmark to enhance the comparability and fairness of capital management.

Fourth, the rating criteria should be flexibly adjusted for financial institutions’ bond investment. To encourage financial institutions to participate in the bond market, reduce the adverse effect of “one size fits all” rating requirements and unleash market vitality, it is suggested to flexibly adjust the bond rating criteria set forth in the existing policies and financial institutions’ internal rules. With reference to the ChinaBond MIR, the target of rating constraints should turn from individual bonds to bond portfolios, so as to develop the assessment method and investment criteria based on the portfolio-wide default rate.

Fifth, the repurchase should become available to foreign commercial institutions in a well-paced manner. It is suggested to make the repurchase available to foreign commercial institutions step by step, starting with the reverse repurchase, and then for the repurchase at controlled leverage. In addition, efforts should be made to gradually address the equivalence between generally accepted international repurchase agreements, such as the GMRA, and China’s master repurchase agreements. Foreign institutional investors should be allowed to choose to which master repurchase agreement to use, so as to facilitate business operations. While adapting trading rules to international practices, the court and arbitral tribunal of competent jurisdiction should stay onshore China.

Sixth, CGB futures should be promoted in a well-ordered manner. CGB futures are an important instrument for hedging interest rate risk, featuring standardization and effectiveness in forestalling interaction between interest rate risk and liquidity risk. Commercial banks have large bond holdings and strong demand for hedging interest rate risk. Their participation in the CGB futures market will help stabilize the spot market and make the financial system more resilient to risks. It is suggested to implement the CGB futures business quickly among approved banks, expand the scope of participants properly, allow market makers to participate in CGB futures, prudently open the CGB futures to foreign institutions and promote risk management.

iii. Leveraging central depository service to support a multi-level bond market

First, the central depository should be upheld. At the core of upholding the central depository is staying true to “central confirmation of ownership” and “see-through supervision”, and making improvements where inadequacies in implementation are seen. For example, the asset management products (including wealth management products) that invest in bonds should open separate accounts with the CSD, rather than using an omnibus account. This approach prevents the risk of misappropriation through see-through supervision while boosting settlement efficiency and lowering operational risks. For overseas investors entering the market via a custodian bank, it is suggested that in addition to the agent account, a separate account for the end investor be opened with the CSD, thus enabling see-through supervision while ensuring services for overseas investors.

Second, a single back office should be in place to support diversified front offices. In order to build a multi-level bond market, the liquidity needs should be met with diversified front offices for trading, and the safety and efficiency of settlement should be ensured with a centralized and integrated back office. The best solution is central interconnection. Namely, a CSD connects several front offices, which is significantly more efficient than the arrangements for cross-opening of accounts between multiple depositories. If the latter persists, we must follow the principles of see-through supervision and settlement at a primary venue. The CSD opens separate bond accounts and provide final settlement services for end investors, so as to prevent the potential risk arising from cross-opening of accounts.

Specifically, it is suggested to establish a multi-platform and multi-window trading system divided into multiple tiers, including inter-bank market and exchanges, CCRE and SHIE, regional trading centers and bank counters, so that they focus on different areas while supplementing and competing with each other appropriately. Meanwhile, the CSD should create a direct link with front offices to support cross-market transactions in a cost-effective manner. Drawing upon the experience gained in Ping An Bank No. 1 Micro Consumer Loan ABS in 2014, it is suggested to start with a direct link between CCDC and the exchange to try and pursue cross-market connectivity. In addition, the back offices should be integrated to separate bonds from stocks, and CSD functions from CCP functions. Further integration can be made to form a nation-wide financial infrastructure layout with complete functions, strong risk control, sound governance and global leadership.

iv. Strengthen information disclosure and enhance the standardization and see-through supervision

First, it is necessary to unify disclosure standards and data sharing for corporate credit bonds. A stepwise approach is recommended toward the ultimate goal of ongoing disclosure featuring “one-time edit and upload for multi-party sharing and multi-platform disclosure”. The first step is to achieve the objective for individual types of bonds, such as the enterprise bond standardization and data sharing between CCDC, SSE and SZSE. The second step is to achieve the standardization and data sharing for enterprise bonds and unlisted corporate bonds. The last step is to promote the standardization and data sharing for the entire universe of corporate credit bonds, including enterprise bonds, corporate bonds and debt financing instruments. Consideration should be given to setting up a disclosure standards committee for corporate credit bonds, so that all platforms can participate in the making of standards and discuss the application and updating of standards, so as to ensure that the standards are updated synchronously and unified over the long term. As for system development, it is suggested that, in the near term, the acceptance and examination system be used as the disclosure system for individual types of bonds, so that the acceptance and examination agency can share the disclosure with other disclosure platforms. Take enterprise bonds for example, after the issuer uploads the disclosure documents in the XBRL format to CCDC, CCDC may simultaneously share them with SSE and SZSE. In the medium and long terms, it is suggested to establish a shared disclosure mechanism for various types of bonds, so as to enable all issuers of corporate credit bonds to submit XBRL-formatted documents via one disclosure system, which automatically forwards the documents to other disclosure platforms based on the bond type and cross-market status. To further facilitate the issuer and reduce disclosure platforms’ reliance on paper documents with seals and stamps, it is suggested that the shared disclosure system be open to the issuers and the lead underwriters, and allow capable issuers to upload information by themselves with a proper identity verification process. The lead underwriter should be allowed to view the documents uploaded by the issuer, confirm the contents of the documents and the timeliness of uploading and assume joint and several responsibilities.

Second, information disclosure should be improved for private placed bonds. To further improve the quality of private placed bond disclosures, it is suggested to promote the unification of disclosure standards in the future rules and regulations on corporate bonds. More specifically: The issuer should, with reference to the Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure of Corporate Credit Bonds, disclose in a timely manner the issuer’s audited financial reports for the last three years and the latest accounting statements, prospectus and credit rating report. The issuer should make timely ongoing disclosure with reference to the Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure of Corporate Credit Bonds. After the issuance of private placed bonds, the announcement of issuance results should be disclosed promptly, including but not limited to planned proceeds, actual proceeds, coupon rate, issuance price, number of subscribers, number of compliant and effective subscribers, and the highest and lowest subscription rate. The issuer should make disclosures in a standardized form through a trusted channel, and may disclose the financial information in a timely and comprehensive manner in an Excel/XBRL-based standard and electronic format.

Third, information disclosure should be enhanced for defaulted bonds. It is suggested to improve the information disclosure of defaulted bonds. More specifically: Information disclosure should be enhanced for bond defaults, and the issuers and intermediaries should provide timely and accurate information related to the defaults, especially the amounts of principal and interest involved. If the defaulting issuer has entered bankruptcy proceedings, it is suggested to require the disclosure of important documents such as reorganization plan and settlement plan. If the debts corresponding to bonds are rescheduled pursuant to the reorganization plan or the defaulted bonds are paid off with self-raised funds or by the introduction of strategic investor, the relevant debt service and contract fulfillment should be disclosed in a timely manner and, if the debt service is complete or the contract is not fulfilled, relevant information should be disclosed. The disclosure of defaulting issuers’ regular financial reports should be enhanced.

Fourth, standard asset-level disclosure should be promoted for ABS. China’s interbank market is an early mover in credit ABS, showing well-established disclosure rules and closest product features to those in mature ABS markets such as the US. Moreover, the information registration system enables look-through into underlying assets, thus improving the standardization of underlying data and setting stage for asset-level disclosure. It is suggested to promote standard disclosure of important information about individual assets underlying the ABS, thereby helping investors and third-party valuation agencies conduct risk assessment and make decisions on a well-informed basis, boosting information symmetry and vitalizing the market. At the legislative level, research is suggested to have the governing law for ABS set forth overarching rules governing the look-through disclosure of underlying assets, thus establishing the legislative and regulatory basis for look-through disclosure and addressing the conflict of laws on privacy protection. At the policy level, preferential policies (e.g. lifting restrictions on issue size and granting interest rate discounts) can be introduced in the early stage in favor of originators who voluntarily disclose information on individual underlying assets. With market acceptance increased, policies can be introduced for asset-level disclosure of products of various types. At the operational level, CCDC, based on the comparative study on ABS disclosure between China and the US, drafted the standards for asset-level disclosure of credit ABS jointly with several professional agencies. The standards take into full account the user-friendliness, convenience and privacy protection of underlying borrowers, which is an industry-wise consensus. The standards can be used as a reference to improve information registration, provide data query services and eventually achieve full disclosure.

v. Upgrade bond market standards and improve the industry-wide standards system

The National Standardization Development Outline calls for further strengthening standardization, vitalizing market participants and increasing the proportion of standards formulated by market participants. In this context, we should step up the efforts to build a system of professional and fine-grained industry standards for the bond market. China has achieved many historic breakthroughs in its bond market over the past four decades, boasting global leadership in many market arrangements. The standards that have repeatedly proved to be advanced, effective and globally leading should be upgraded to industry standards.

It is suggested to upgrade the ChinaBond Green Bond Environmental Impact Disclosure Indicator System to an industry standard, explore its pilot use in the Greater Bay Area and then scale-up and promote its inclusion into the relevant international agenda in due course. The ChinaBond ESG Evaluation System can be an industry standard for the bond market, and efforts should be encouraged to develop ESG evaluation and analysis tools and database. A system of bond market industry standards can be built based on the following CCDC documents: the Technical Guide for the Management of Bond Collateral, the Standard for Bidding and Awarding for Bond Issuance, the Standard for Calculation Methodology for Pricing Indicators of Fixed Income Securities, the Standard for Compiling the Yield Curves and Bond Valuations, the Elements for Registration of Fixed Income Securities and the Standard for Repayment of Principal of Fixed Income Securities.

vi. Deepen the application of bond yield curves and enrich the policy toolkit

First, new ways of using the CGB yield curve should be developed. It is suggested to innovate and enrich financial products that use the CGB yield as benchmark, including issuing floating-rate government bonds based on short-term CGB yields and developing derivatives underlain by CGB yields.

Second, efforts can be made to use the yield curve as a pricing benchmark on a broader scale. It is suggested to expand the use of CGB yields as a pricing benchmark to non-bond financial assets, including debt, equity and derivatives, so as to promote the effective transmission of interest rates across the entire financial market. Given the complete and continuous term structure of bond yields, it is suggested to incorporate the yield curves of bonds, such as CGBs and credit bonds, into the loan pricing references in addition to the loan prime rate (LPR).

Third, the use of CGB yield in policy and market can be scaled up. The correlation between the 10-year CGB yield and the potential economic growth rate is relatively stable. Thus the 10-year CGB yield can be used as an important policy reference target and a measure of the appropriateness of monetary policy. As collateral is used in open market operations, Treasury cash management as well as bond repurchases and bond lending, it is suggested to use a mark-to-market approach based on the valuation derived from CGB yields, so as to fully harness the CGB yield curve as a benchmark. With CGBs expanding in scale and improving in liquidity, the resumption of spot bond trading in the open market will help better harness the CGB yield as pricing benchmark, boost the efficiency of policy transmission and improve the liquidity of the CGB market.

vii. Refine the rating and taxation mechanisms

First, to explore the “issuer pays, investors choose” arrangements. To improve the fairness and independence of ratings, it is imperative to give investors the freedom to choose rating agencies. However, if we adopt the “investor pays” model, there will be some problems, mainly including the following: The use of different rating agencies by different investors will add to the communication barriers and trading costs; if only a few investors purchase the rating service, the liquidity of bonds may be affected; the issuer may not be cooperative enough, and may provide information that is not objective, timely or comprehensive; it is difficult to avoid the conflicts of interest, and investors and intermediaries may have an interest in each other. Therefore, it is suggested to explore the “issuer pays, investors vote” mechanism, that is, the rating service is still paid by the issuer, but the investors vote to choose the rating agency. On the one hand, this mechanism can cut off the link of interests between the issuer and the rating agency, ease the conflict of interests and improve the impartiality and neutrality of the rating agency’s service. On the other hand, the “issuer pays” model will bring its economies of scale into full play and improve the operating efficiency in the bond market. We can also explore the “issuer pays, investors vote” mechanism for choosing accounting firms and law firms.

Second, the tax arrangements for CGB interest income and capital gains should be improved. It is suggested to levy taxes on both interest income and capital gains from CGB, or on neither of them, to encourage trading and raise liquidity in the CGB market, eliminate the pricing distortion caused by exemption of interest income and better harness the CGB yield curve as pricing benchmark.

Third, the tax policies should be unified for wealth management and public offered funds. As the regulatory indicators for public offered funds and bank wealth management products are increasingly aligned, it is suggested to apply the same tax policies.

The English version is for reference only. In case of any inconsistencies, the original Chinese version shall prevail.

Author from: Research and Development Center, CCDC

Editors in charge: Lu Ningning, Yin Ying

This article was first published on Bond Monthly (Apr.2022). Please indicate the source clearly when citing this article. The English version is for reference only, and the original Chinese version shall prevail in case of any inconsistency.

◇ 本文原載《債券》2022年4月刊

◇ 作者:中央結算公司中債研發中心 馮源 李波

◇ 責任編輯:鹿寧寧 印穎

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