作者：兰顺正

首发自：CGTN

近日有报道称，在11月2日英国国防部表示，计划收回英国核武研究所（AWE）的控制权，进行“国有化”管理。不难看出，英方此举显示出其追求核力量独立性的趋势。

1952年成功试爆原子弹后，英国成了继美、苏之后世界上第三个拥有核武器的国家，但是长期以来英国核武器对美国的依赖非常严重。1958年英国和美国签订了《双边防务协定》。根据这个协定，英国可以从美国得到相关的核武器技术，发展核武器；英国可以利用美国的实验室进行相关试验；英国可以在美国的内华达核试验场进行核试验。1962年两国又签订了《拿骚协定》，规定由美国向英国提供北极星潜射导弹，核弹头和装载导弹的潜艇由英国自行研制，发射权可由英国控制，但英国的核力量必须作为北约核力量的一部分，发射的钥匙由美英两家共管。自此以后，英国的核战略被纳入了美国全球战略的范围，英国几乎完全失去了核独立性。

冷战后，英国国内在是否应该恢复独立核威慑这个问题上的意见并不统一。有部分英国人认为，英国应安心接受美国的“核保护伞”，把更新和维持核武库的高昂费用转入卫生、教育、社会救助和防范全球变暖等方面。也有人强调作为一个大国，英国应该选择和制订独立的核威慑战略，逐渐减少对美国“三叉戟”导弹的依赖，加紧研发自己的核武器。虽然英国在防务和安全事务上依赖于美国可谓是有利有弊，但自身的核威慑能力受制于他国确实使英国非常难堪。如英媒曾经撰文，指出英国独立的核威慑是一个精心编织的政治神话，旨在给英国老百姓一种虚假的安慰。而前皇家海军军官们曾经在私下证实，美国知道英国潜艇的位置，而且没有美国提供的数据和卫星系统，英军想要发射导弹几乎是不可能的。

明显的是，此次英国政府计划收回AWE的做法，表现出了对建立独立核威慑战略这一观点的支持。

目前，英国的核威慑主要依赖4艘“前卫”级核潜艇来实现，该型潜艇每艘配备16枚美制D5型“三叉戟”潜射弹道导弹，每枚导弹可搭载8枚核弹头，射程超过7400公里。主体位于英格兰南部阿尔德马斯顿的AWE，则是负责为英国核潜艇制造与维护“三叉戟”核威慑弹头的主要机构。同时，由于“前卫”级核潜艇和“三叉戟”系统服役均已超过20年，可靠性堪忧。因此在2015年英国议会批准了价值约310亿英镑的“三叉戟”核武器系统更新计划，批准建造4艘新一代“无畏”级战略核潜艇，用以替代“前卫”级核潜艇。而且英国也在积极推进研发自己的W93核弹头，并确保与“三叉戟”系统的兼容性，预计新的核武系统将在2030年左右服役，而AWE无疑会在其中扮演重要角色，所以可以说不论是现在还是将来，该研究所对于英国核威慑至关重要。不过自1999年以来，AWE研究所被英国政府外包给一个联合管理公司运营，其中美企洛克希德·马丁（ Lockheed Martin ）占有该集团51％的股份，美国外包服务商嘉科（Jacobs Engineering）及英国外包商信佳（Serco）分别拥有24.5％的股份，因此AWE这一核心机构其实一直是由美企所主导，这在很大程度上影响了英国追求核独立的步伐。另外还有报道称，该研究所在管理上存在大量漏洞，据统计2019年全年AWE发生过10起“非正常”安全事故，如冷却水发生泄漏、真空管未正确接入卡盘、卡盘安全机制操作有误等，平均每5周发生一起。

以上种种，都让英国觉得收回AWE势在必行。据报道，英国国防部于11月2日表示，计划于2021年6月从上述三家公司中，收回对AWE研究所的运营与发展的直接控制权。按照英媒的说法，英国国防部打算最早在未来几天内采取行动，计划对AWE研究所进行重新国有化管理。这也意味着AWE研究所在经过二十多年的私有化管理后，将正式于明年重返英国政府麾下。英国政府还指出，尽早结束这一商业合同，将能提高政府管理英国核威慑力量的灵活性。与此同时，如果有需要AWE研究所还必须保留设计新武器的能力。

综上，未来英国的核威慑政策有可能将更加趋于独立。

（以下为英文原文）

UK's plan to reclaim AWE shows its wish for nuclear force independence

Lan Shunzheng

The Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, Berkshire, UK, July 8, 2017. /Getty

Editor's note: Lan Shunzheng is a research fellow at Charhar Institute and a member of the Chinese Institute of Command and Control. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

On November 2, the British Ministry of Defense said that it planned to take back the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) control and carry out nationalization management. It is not difficult to see that the British side showed its pursuit of the nuclear force independence trend.

After the successful test of the atomic bomb in 1952, Britain became the third country possessing nuclear weapons in the world after the United States and the Soviet Union.

However, for a long time, Britain's nuclear weapons depended heavily on the United States.

In 1958, the UK and the U.S. signed the Mutual Defense Agreement. Under this agreement, Britain could acquire relevant nuclear weapon technology from the U.S. to develop nuclear weapons, use American laboratories to conduct tests, and conduct nuclear tests at America's Nevada nuclear test site.

In 1962, the two countries signed the Nassau Agreement, which stipulated that the United States should provide Britain with arctic star submarine-launched missiles, nuclear warheads and submarines loaded with missiles should be developed by Britain itself, and the launching right could be controlled by Britain.

However, Britain's nuclear force must be part of NATO's nuclear force, and the key to launch should be jointly managed by the United States and Britain. Since then, Britain's nuclear strategy has been incorporated into the global strategy of the United States, and Britain has almost completely lost its nuclear independence.

After the Cold War, Britain's domestic views on whether to restore independent nuclear deterrence were not uniform. Some Britons believe the UK should embrace the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" and shift the high cost of renewing and maintaining its nuclear arsenal to health, education, social assistance, and global warming prevention.

It is also emphasized that as a major country, Britain should choose and develop an independent nuclear deterrent strategy, gradually reduce its dependence on the U.S. Trident missiles, and intensify the development of its own nuclear weapons. Britain's dependence on America for defense and security is both a blessing and a curse, but its nuclear deterrent is deeply embarrassing.

For example, the British media once wrote that Britain's independent nuclear deterrent was a carefully woven political myth designed to provide false comfort to ordinary British people. It is said that former Royal Navy officers have privately confirmed that the Americans know where British submarines are located and that it would be almost impossible to fire a missile without the data and satellite systems provided by the Americans.

Obviously, the British government's plan to reclaim AWE showed its support for the idea of establishing an independent nuclear deterrent strategy.

At present, Britain's nuclear deterrence mainly relies on four avant-garde class nuclear submarines, each of which is equipped with 16 U.S.-made D5 Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles, each of which can carry eight nuclear warheads and have a range of more than 7,400 kilometers. The Atomic Weapons Establishment, which is located in Aldermaston, south of England, is the main institution responsible for manufacturing and maintaining the "Trident" nuclear deterrent warhead for British nuclear submarines.

Submariners undergo training at HMNB Clyde, which is the home of the UK's Trident nuclear deterrent in Faslane, Scotland, UK, April 29, 2019. /Getty

Meanwhile, the reliability of avant-garde nuclear submarines and Trident systems, both of which have been in service for over 20 years, is worrying. Therefore, in 2015, the British Parliament approved the Trident nuclear weapon system renewal plan worth about 31 billion pounds ($41 billion) and approved the construction of four new-generation Dauntless-class strategic nuclear submarines to replace Vanguard-class nuclear submarines.

Britain is also actively promoting the development of its own W93 nuclear warhead and ensuring compatibility with the Trident system. It is expected that the new nuclear weapon system will be put into service around 2030, and AWE will undoubtedly play an important role in it.

Therefore, it can be said that the research institute is of great importance to British nuclear deterrence regardless of the time. But since 1999, AWE has been outsourced to a joint management company by the British government, Lockheed Martin of the U.S. owns 51 percent of the group, Jacobs Engineering of the U.S. and Serco of the UK each own 24.5 percent. This means that AWE has always been dominated by American companies, which greatly influenced Britain's pace of pursuing nuclear independence.

It is also reported that there are a lot of loopholes in the management of the research institute. According to statistics, there have been 10 "abnormal" safety accidents with AWE in 2019, such as cooling water leakage, vacuum tube improperly connected to the chuck, chuck safety mechanism operation error, etc., occurring once every five weeks on average.

All of which makes Britain feel compelled to take back AWE. It is reported that the British Ministry of Defense said on November 2 that it planned to regain direct control over the operation and development of AWE from the above three companies in June 2021.

According to the British media, the British Ministry of Defense is going to take action in the next few days at the earliest and plan to renationalize AWE research. It means that AWE will officially return to the British government next year after more than two decades of privatization.

To sum up, Britain's nuclear deterrent policy is likely to be more independent in the future.