作者：蘭順正

首發自：CGTN

近日有報道稱，在11月2日英國國防部表示，計劃收回英國核武研究所（AWE）的控制權，進行“國有化”管理。不難看出，英方此舉顯示出其追求核力量獨立性的趨勢。

1952年成功試爆原子彈後，英國成了繼美、蘇之後世界上第三個擁有核武器的國家，但是長期以來英國核武器對美國的依賴非常嚴重。1958年英國和美國簽訂了《雙邊防務協定》。根據這個協定，英國可以從美國得到相關的核武器技術，發展核武器；英國可以利用美國的實驗室進行相關試驗；英國可以在美國的內華達核試驗場進行核試驗。1962年兩國又簽訂了《拿騷協定》，規定由美國向英國提供北極星潛射導彈，核彈頭和裝載導彈的潛艇由英國自行研製，發射權可由英國控制，但英國的核力量必須作爲北約核力量的一部分，發射的鑰匙由美英兩家共管。自此以後，英國的核戰略被納入了美國全球戰略的範圍，英國幾乎完全失去了核獨立性。

冷戰後，英國國內在是否應該恢復獨立核威懾這個問題上的意見並不統一。有部分英國人認爲，英國應安心接受美國的“覈保護傘”，把更新和維持核武庫的高昂費用轉入衛生、教育、社會救助和防範全球變暖等方面。也有人強調作爲一個大國，英國應該選擇和制訂獨立的核威懾戰略，逐漸減少對美國“三叉戟”導彈的依賴，加緊研發自己的核武器。雖然英國在防務和安全事務上依賴於美國可謂是有利有弊，但自身的核威懾能力受制於他國確實使英國非常難堪。如英媒曾經撰文，指出英國獨立的核威懾是一個精心編織的政治神話，旨在給英國老百姓一種虛假的安慰。而前皇家海軍軍官們曾經在私下證實，美國知道英國潛艇的位置，而且沒有美國提供的數據和衛星系統，英軍想要發射導彈幾乎是不可能的。

明顯的是，此次英國政府計劃收回AWE的做法，表現出了對建立獨立核威懾戰略這一觀點的支持。

目前，英國的核威懾主要依賴4艘“前衛”級核潛艇來實現，該型潛艇每艘配備16枚美製D5型“三叉戟”潛射彈道導彈，每枚導彈可搭載8枚核彈頭，射程超過7400公里。主體位於英格蘭南部阿爾德馬斯頓的AWE，則是負責爲英國核潛艇製造與維護“三叉戟”核威懾彈頭的主要機構。同時，由於“前衛”級核潛艇和“三叉戟”系統服役均已超過20年，可靠性堪憂。因此在2015年英國議會批准了價值約310億英鎊的“三叉戟”核武器系統更新計劃，批准建造4艘新一代“無畏”級戰略核潛艇，用以替代“前衛”級核潛艇。而且英國也在積極推進研發自己的W93核彈頭，並確保與“三叉戟”系統的兼容性，預計新的核武系統將在2030年左右服役，而AWE無疑會在其中扮演重要角色，所以可以說不論是現在還是將來，該研究所對於英國核威懾至關重要。不過自1999年以來，AWE研究所被英國政府外包給一個聯合管理公司運營，其中美企洛克希德·馬丁（ Lockheed Martin ）佔有該集團51％的股份，美國外包服務商嘉科（Jacobs Engineering）及英國外包商信佳（Serco）分別擁有24.5％的股份，因此AWE這一核心機構其實一直是由美企所主導，這在很大程度上影響了英國追求核獨立的步伐。另外還有報道稱，該研究所在管理上存在大量漏洞，據統計2019年全年AWE發生過10起“非正常”安全事故，如冷卻水發生泄漏、真空管未正確接入卡盤、卡盤安全機制操作有誤等，平均每5周發生一起。

以上種種，都讓英國覺得收回AWE勢在必行。據報道，英國國防部於11月2日表示，計劃於2021年6月從上述三家公司中，收回對AWE研究所的運營與發展的直接控制權。按照英媒的說法，英國國防部打算最早在未來幾天內採取行動，計劃對AWE研究所進行重新國有化管理。這也意味着AWE研究所在經過二十多年的私有化管理後，將正式於明年重返英國政府麾下。英國政府還指出，儘早結束這一商業合同，將能提高政府管理英國核威懾力量的靈活性。與此同時，如果有需要AWE研究所還必須保留設計新武器的能力。

綜上，未來英國的核威懾政策有可能將更加趨於獨立。

（以下爲英文原文）

UK's plan to reclaim AWE shows its wish for nuclear force independence

Lan Shunzheng

The Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, Berkshire, UK, July 8, 2017. /Getty

Editor's note: Lan Shunzheng is a research fellow at Charhar Institute and a member of the Chinese Institute of Command and Control. The article reflects the author's opinions, and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

On November 2, the British Ministry of Defense said that it planned to take back the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) control and carry out nationalization management. It is not difficult to see that the British side showed its pursuit of the nuclear force independence trend.

After the successful test of the atomic bomb in 1952, Britain became the third country possessing nuclear weapons in the world after the United States and the Soviet Union.

However, for a long time, Britain's nuclear weapons depended heavily on the United States.

In 1958, the UK and the U.S. signed the Mutual Defense Agreement. Under this agreement, Britain could acquire relevant nuclear weapon technology from the U.S. to develop nuclear weapons, use American laboratories to conduct tests, and conduct nuclear tests at America's Nevada nuclear test site.

In 1962, the two countries signed the Nassau Agreement, which stipulated that the United States should provide Britain with arctic star submarine-launched missiles, nuclear warheads and submarines loaded with missiles should be developed by Britain itself, and the launching right could be controlled by Britain.

However, Britain's nuclear force must be part of NATO's nuclear force, and the key to launch should be jointly managed by the United States and Britain. Since then, Britain's nuclear strategy has been incorporated into the global strategy of the United States, and Britain has almost completely lost its nuclear independence.

After the Cold War, Britain's domestic views on whether to restore independent nuclear deterrence were not uniform. Some Britons believe the UK should embrace the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" and shift the high cost of renewing and maintaining its nuclear arsenal to health, education, social assistance, and global warming prevention.

It is also emphasized that as a major country, Britain should choose and develop an independent nuclear deterrent strategy, gradually reduce its dependence on the U.S. Trident missiles, and intensify the development of its own nuclear weapons. Britain's dependence on America for defense and security is both a blessing and a curse, but its nuclear deterrent is deeply embarrassing.

For example, the British media once wrote that Britain's independent nuclear deterrent was a carefully woven political myth designed to provide false comfort to ordinary British people. It is said that former Royal Navy officers have privately confirmed that the Americans know where British submarines are located and that it would be almost impossible to fire a missile without the data and satellite systems provided by the Americans.

Obviously, the British government's plan to reclaim AWE showed its support for the idea of establishing an independent nuclear deterrent strategy.

At present, Britain's nuclear deterrence mainly relies on four avant-garde class nuclear submarines, each of which is equipped with 16 U.S.-made D5 Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles, each of which can carry eight nuclear warheads and have a range of more than 7,400 kilometers. The Atomic Weapons Establishment, which is located in Aldermaston, south of England, is the main institution responsible for manufacturing and maintaining the "Trident" nuclear deterrent warhead for British nuclear submarines.

Submariners undergo training at HMNB Clyde, which is the home of the UK's Trident nuclear deterrent in Faslane, Scotland, UK, April 29, 2019. /Getty

Meanwhile, the reliability of avant-garde nuclear submarines and Trident systems, both of which have been in service for over 20 years, is worrying. Therefore, in 2015, the British Parliament approved the Trident nuclear weapon system renewal plan worth about 31 billion pounds ($41 billion) and approved the construction of four new-generation Dauntless-class strategic nuclear submarines to replace Vanguard-class nuclear submarines.

Britain is also actively promoting the development of its own W93 nuclear warhead and ensuring compatibility with the Trident system. It is expected that the new nuclear weapon system will be put into service around 2030, and AWE will undoubtedly play an important role in it.

Therefore, it can be said that the research institute is of great importance to British nuclear deterrence regardless of the time. But since 1999, AWE has been outsourced to a joint management company by the British government, Lockheed Martin of the U.S. owns 51 percent of the group, Jacobs Engineering of the U.S. and Serco of the UK each own 24.5 percent. This means that AWE has always been dominated by American companies, which greatly influenced Britain's pace of pursuing nuclear independence.

It is also reported that there are a lot of loopholes in the management of the research institute. According to statistics, there have been 10 "abnormal" safety accidents with AWE in 2019, such as cooling water leakage, vacuum tube improperly connected to the chuck, chuck safety mechanism operation error, etc., occurring once every five weeks on average.

All of which makes Britain feel compelled to take back AWE. It is reported that the British Ministry of Defense said on November 2 that it planned to regain direct control over the operation and development of AWE from the above three companies in June 2021.

According to the British media, the British Ministry of Defense is going to take action in the next few days at the earliest and plan to renationalize AWE research. It means that AWE will officially return to the British government next year after more than two decades of privatization.

To sum up, Britain's nuclear deterrent policy is likely to be more independent in the future.