10年前馬化騰就爲“騰訊壟斷”的罪名喊冤：

Ten years ago, Ma Huateng felt deeply wronged for the charge of "Tencent’s Monopolization":

“壟斷是一個令人煩惱的罪名，但有時候確實是一個假想的罪名。"

"Monopolization is an annoying charge, but sometimes it is just a hypothetical charge."

但10年過去了，你覺得現在還有人在說騰訊壟斷嗎？我在上集DannyData視頻徵集大家對騰訊的問題，被點贊最多的就是：“騰訊會不會走向壟斷？”看來馬化騰還需要繼續喊冤啊。

Ten years have passed, do people still think that Tencent is a monopolized company? When I collected your questions about Tencent in the last episode of DannyData, the one that got the most likes was: "Will Tencent become a monopolized company?" It seems that Ma Huateng needs to explain more.

而且我預計10年後，說騰訊壟斷的聲音還會存在，到時候看看老丹尼是“帶預言家”還是“打臉永動機”。

And I predict that 10 years later, the criticism of Tencent's monopolization will still be there. Let’s see then if Old Danny is a prophet or I have to eat my own words again.

那今天我就從三個方面來講講：騰訊會不會走向壟斷呢？

In this episode, I will answer the question in three aspects: Will Tencent become a monopolized company?

我是小丹尼，談車說科技。本集視頻論據仍然遵循我的潔癖標準：隨你反駁，所有論據都是騰訊一手信息。其實我說“隨你反駁”，意思是我非常歡迎有理、有據、有數據的反駁，但如果是槓精反駁，那一定是你對。

I'm Danny, I talk about tech and cars. As usual, all information used in my video is authentic and first-hand. You're welcome to disagree with my arguments, but don't doubt my sources. Well, what I mean "disagree with my arguments" is that I welcome a rational debate with facts and data, but if you are a devil’s advocate, then you must be right.

我知道很多小同學想聽我直接說結論：“小丹尼你就說騰訊到底是不是壟斷吧？”抱歉這個問題我無法給你簡單粗暴的結論，我只能掰開揉碎從三個方面給你講：

I know that many of you are waiting for a conclusion: "Danny, just tell us whether Tencent is a monopolized company." Sorry guys, I can't give you a simple and rough conclusion, but break the question into three small ones:

1、騰訊壟斷了什麼？

2、騰訊沒壟斷什麼？

3、騰訊以後還會壟斷嗎？

1. What does Tencent monopolize?

2. What does Tencent not monopolized?

3. Will Tencent monopolize on anything in the future?

爲什麼我要從三個方面來講？這就好比你問我：“米其林餐廳到底好喫不好喫？”米其林餐廳有法式大餐，也有街邊牛腩；有拿手好菜，也有垃圾充數。而騰訊壟斷的問題，可能比米其林餐廳是否好喫還要複雜。

Why do I talk from three aspects? This is just like you asking me: "Is Michelin-starred restaurant good or not?" Michelin-starred restaurant has French cuisine and also street sirloin. There are specialty dishes, but also token dishes. Whether Tencent is a monopolized company may be a more complicated question than whether food in a Michelin-starred restaurant is delicious.

01 騰訊壟斷了什麼

先說第一點：騰訊壟斷了什麼？

So, the first point: what does Tencent monopolize?

我先拋出一個可能會刺激某些小同學心臟的觀點：大家沒必要過分批判壟斷。

Let me first give a point of view that might be repellent to you: people don't have to criticize monopolization too harshly.

估計這裏會有人反駁我了："壟斷你還不讓人批判？小丹尼你是不是支持搞獨裁？" 慢着，大帽子先別急着給我扣上。請聽我解釋爲什麼"不要過分批判壟斷"，有兩個原因。

Some of you may disagree with me: "Monopolization should not be criticized? Do you support dictatorship, Danny?" Hold on, don't get me wrong. Please let me explain why not to criticize monopolization too harshly. There are two reasons.

第一個原因，壟斷之爭，其實就是定義範圍之爭。注意關鍵詞：定義範圍。

The first reason, the monopolization dispute is a dispute over the defined scopes. Pay attention to the keywords: the defined scopes.

比如你的班主任在你們班的權威就是壟斷的，定義範圍就是你們班；你媽在你家的財務管理是壟斷的，定義範圍就是你家；你對自己的時間管理也是壟斷的，定義範圍就是你自己。

For example, your class teacher has a monopoly on authority in the scope of your class; your mother has a monopoly on financial management in the scope of your family; you have a monopoly on time management in the scope of yourself.

類似的，討論一家公司是不是壟斷，也要定義範圍：它到底壟斷了什麼？

Similarly, when discussing whether a company is monopolized, it is also necessary to define the scopes: what does it monopolize?

比如如果定義範圍是全球搜索引擎，那谷歌肯定是壟斷的，如果定義範圍是科技產品，那谷歌就是不壟斷的。

For example, if the scope is global search engines, then it is monopolized by Google. If the scope is technology products, then Google is not a monopoly.

再比如當年人人批判微軟搞壟斷，微軟強迫製造商預裝自己的IE瀏覽器和媒體播放器等等，其實也是定義範圍之爭，比如微軟辯稱說IE瀏覽器是Windows系統的一部分，而網景等公司狀告微軟瀏覽器就是獨立的，不能搞捆綁銷售。

Another example is the criticism towards Microsoft for monopolization when it forced manufacturers to pre-install its IE browser and media player. Actually, this is also a dispute over the defined scopes. Microsoft argued that the IE browser is a part of the Windows system, and other companies like Netscape sued Microsoft that the browser is independent and cannot be bundled.

所以很多問題都是定義範圍之爭，包括我之前和老蔣 中路對狙辯論視頻 ，感興趣可以去看。

As such, many issues are disputes over the scopes, just like in the previous video I debated with Lao Jiang. You can watch it if you are interested.

所以騰訊到底壟斷了什麼呢？如果你的定義範圍是“中國互聯網社交產品”，那騰訊就是壟斷的，比如你可以從DannyData數據可視化看出，騰訊2020年一季度，微信和WeChat的每月活躍用戶數MAU已經高達12.03億。

So what exactly does Tencent monopolize? If your scope is "Chinese Internet social products", then Tencent is a monopoly. You can see from the visualized data in DannyData that the monthly active users (MAU) of WeChat in the first quarter of 2020 has reached 1.203 billion.

騰訊微信&QQ總月活躍用戶數

第二個原因，很多互聯網業務，就是要有寡頭壟斷的，或者叫贏家通喫。

The second reason is that many Internet businesses require an oligopoly. In other words, the winner takes all.

比如互聯網的底層應用——社交，就是一個贏家通喫的業務，國外是Facebook，國內是騰訊，背後的邏輯是梅特卡夫定理（Metcalfe‘s Law）：

For example, the underlying application of the Internet, social networking, is a winner-take-all business. Facebook is the winner in foreign countries and Tencent is the domestic one. The rationale behind is Metcalfe’s Law:

“在Internet中，當節點或叫用戶之間的連線數目增加時，這些連線造成的效果會呈倍數增加，即網絡總的交易機會正比於基於Internet節點數目的平方。”

"On the Internet, when the number of nodes or the connections between users increases, the effect caused by these connections will increase exponentially. That is, the total transaction opportunity of the network is proportional to the square of the number of nodes based on the Internet."

說白了就是你的七大姑八大姨每多一個人用微信，產生的效用並不是線性增長而是指數型增長。你可以簡單理解爲1+1>4，意思是你和朋友交換了信息，雙方不只是獲得了對方的信息，還能產生火花，碰撞出新的信息。

To put it bluntly, every one more member in your family uses WeChat, the effect is not linear but exponential growth. You can simply understand as 1+1>4, which means that when you and your friend exchange information, the two of you not only obtain the information about each other but also spark new information.

其實騰訊不只是其核心業務“社交”在中國市場壟斷，還包括微信支付、甚至包括引入社交元素的在線遊戲細分品類等等，都可以說是壟斷的，

In fact, Tencent not only has a monopoly on its core business social networks in the Chinese market, but also on WeChat payment, and even on online game segments that involve social elements, etc.

關鍵看你的定義範圍是什麼。

The key point is to define scopes.

正如俞軍在在《產品方法論》中所說：

As Yu Jun said in "Product Methodologies":

“不是隻有市場份額的獨家壟斷或寡頭壟斷才叫壟斷，因爲產品有情境性，所以在任何情景下只要讓用戶沒有選擇，就形成了局部壟斷。"
“Monopoly not only exists whenever there is an exclusive monopoly or oligopoly of market share because a product has its contextuality. As long as it can leave users with no choice in any scenario, a local monopoly will be formed.”

比如，你的定義範圍是（移動端）喫雞類遊戲，騰訊的《和平精英》、《堡壘之夜》就是壟斷的；你的定義範圍是FPS類遊戲，騰訊的《穿越火線》、《使命召喚》就是壟斷的，玩過以上這些騰訊遊戲的同學請舉個手。

For example, your scope is (mobile device) PUBG-like game, Tencent's "Game for Peace " and "Fortnite" are monopolized; if your defined scope is FPS games, Tencent's "Crossfire" and "Call of Duty" are monopolies. Please raise your hand if you have played these Tencent games.

遊戲市場是一個非常典型的頭部壟斷的市場。所以，騰訊需要主導的關鍵業務，其實就是要去壟斷的。

The game market is a very typical monopoly market. Therefore, the critical business that Tencent needs to lead is actually to monopolize.

那騰訊的關鍵業務是什麼呢？

What is the critical business of Tencent?

我們可以從騰訊的收入結構來分析騰訊業務的底層邏輯。騰訊的收入結構分成五大類，包括社交網絡、在線遊戲、在線廣告、互聯網金融與商業服務和其他，99%的收入來源是前四者。

We can analyze the underlying logic of Tencent's business from its revenue structure. Tencent's revenue structure includes five parts, social networks, online games, online advertising, Internet finance, and business services and others. The former four services provide 99% of the revenue.

而社交網絡+在線遊戲收入仍然佔大頭，在騰訊財報裏統稱爲增值服務收入，2020年一季度佔整體收入的58%。

The majority of revenue comes from the social network and online game, collectively referred to as value-added service revenue in Tencent's earnings report. It occupied 58% of overall revenue in the first quarter of 2020.

我們再更進一步分析，你可以從這張齒輪圖看出來：

Let's analyze it further, you can learn from this gear diagram:

你看這個圖它又長又寬，中間那個藍色齒輪是社交它又大又圓，周圍5個小齒輪分別是在線遊戲、媒體、金融科技、雲服務和公用程序。所以騰訊的底層關鍵業務還是基於社交，而騰訊社交在中國就是壟斷的。

You could see this picture is long and wide. The blue gear in the middle represents the social network. It is large and round. The five small gears graphics around it are online games, media, financial technology, cloud services, and utilities. So Tencent's underlying principal business is still based on the social network, and Tencent social network is a monopoly in China.

說到社交，我多說兩句啊，大家都知道抖音和快手這種短視頻增長勢頭很猛，那你認爲抖音快手對騰訊的威脅大嗎？

Speaking of social network, I would like to say a few more words. Everyone knows that short videos, like TikTok and Kuaishou, are growing very fast. Do you think that TikTok and Kuaishou are big threats on Tencent?

我看有人說抖音快手只是撼動了騰訊互娛中的一小部分，除了短視頻，騰訊互娛中還有長視頻、遊戲、音樂文字等等，你贊同這個觀點嗎？

I've noticed that some people claimed that TikTok and Kuaishou only have impact on a small part of Tencent interactive entertainment. In addition to short videos, Tencent interactive entertainment also has long videos, games, music, and text, etc. Do you agree?

反正我不贊同。我認爲抖音快手這種短視頻，撼動的絕不只是騰訊互娛中的一小部分，還有騰訊整體的兩大部分。

Anyway, I cannot agree with it. I think that the short video of TikTok or Kuaishou not only affect a small part of Tencent interactive entertainment business but also two larger parts of Tencent's business.

先說第一大部分，抖音快手撼動了騰訊社交的根基，視頻社交一定會是未來大趨勢，就像國外的後浪們用Facebook越來越少，連SnapChat這種更潮的“閱後即焚”照片社交平臺也受到了衝擊，現在興起的是像Monkey這種爲Generation Z打造的陌生人視頻社交平臺，以後我會請Monkey的創始人來DannyPal節目裏聊聊，大家可以期待一下。

Let's talk about the first part. TikTok and Kuaishou have shaken the foundation of Tencent's social network. Video socialization will be a future trend.

Like the overseas young people are using Facebook less and less, even the more trendy Snapchat, a "self-destruct" photo social platform, has also been attacked Now, a stranger-based video social platform like Monkey has been created for Generation Z. In the future, I will invite the founder of Monkey to talk on the DannyPal program.

You could look forward to it.

我贊同潘亂老師在《騰訊沒有夢想》文章裏所說：

I agree with what Luan Pan said in the article "Tencent Has No Dream":

抖音快手這種“算法＋短視頻＋開放式關係”產品竟然奇襲了他的社交大本營，在騰訊主導了十多年的“熟人通訊＋封閉關係”之外打開了一條新路。

TikTok and Kuaishou's "algorithm + short video + open relationship" product raid his social base and opened a new path outside the scope of "acquaintance communication + closed relationship”, which Tencent has dominated more than ten years.

而且圖文轉視頻一定是大勢所趨，肯定會有大量的公衆號作者逐漸流失轉向各種視頻平臺，而且這裏我不得不吐槽一下騰訊視頻的同學，自從DannyData半年前開始做視頻，有差不多6-7個騰訊系的視頻運營同學聯繫我，包括但不限於騰訊視頻、視頻號、企鵝號、騰訊科技頻道等等，用兩個詞來總結就是“對接混亂”+“淺嘗輒止”，而且我知道還有很多內容創作者也這麼認爲，騰訊如果還這麼幹，只會流失越來越多的內容創作者，投入其他視頻平臺的懷抱。

And the transfer from text to the video must be a general trend. There will be a large number of WeChat Official Accounts' authors gradually turn their way to various video platforms.

And here I have to say something about the staff of Tencent Video. DannyData started uploading videos six months ago, and around 6-7 different operating staff of different platforms have contacted me, and they all belong to the Tencent Video Department. 

These platforms include but not limited to Tencent Video, Videl Channel, QQ Video, and Tencent Technology Channel, etc., I can sum up this experience in two words: "Chaos" + "Superficial." I know many content creators will agree that if Tencent keeps on doing this, it will only lose more and more content creators and push them to join other video platforms.

再說抖音快手撼動騰訊的第二大部分。

Next, TikTok and Kuaishou have shaken the second largest part of Tencent.

如果我們只看中國互聯網產品的日活量和每日用戶時長，排名前兩名的就是騰訊和字節跳動，說白了就是騰訊和字節跳動的產品都在搶佔你的時間，比如抖音官方宣佈截至2020年1月5日，抖音的日活躍用戶已經突破4億。

If we only look at the daily volume and daily user duration of Chinese Internet products, the top two are Tencent and ByteDance. Put simply, Tencent and ByteDance's products are seizing your time. For example, in the official announcement of TikTok as of January 5, 2020, TikTok's daily active users have exceeded 400 million.

張小龍曾說希望用戶在微信上“用完即走”，那時候微信已經處於壟斷地位，人人都離不開它，而且看不見厲害的對手，用不好聽的話來說就是站着說話不腰疼，這就像一個億萬富翁說不希望自己家的豪宅面積太大一樣。但現在，抖音快手等產品佔據了用戶大量時間，微信不照樣還需要推出視頻號、朋友圈小視頻等等來去應對挑戰嗎？

Xiaolong Zhang once said that he hopes that users will "leave after using" on WeChat. At that time, WeChat was in a monopoly position and everyone could not live without it. Plus, it had no strong competitors in sight. It's like a billionaire saying that s/he doesn't want his/her house to be too large. But now products such as TikTok and Kuaishou have occupied a lot of users' time. WeChat still needs to launch Video Channels, Video on Moments, etc. to meet the challenge?

我自己作爲第一批被邀請入駐微信視頻號的內容創作者，很不看好目前視頻號的發展，這個等我以後講短視頻專題時再詳細聊吧。

As the first batch of content creators invited to the WeChat Video Channels, I am not optimistic about its current development. That will be discussed in detail later when I talk about the short video.

正因爲抖音的強勢，進而影響了騰訊廣告收入。騰訊從2019年一季度開始到現在，騰訊要不是在網絡廣告，就是媒體廣告上收入有下滑。

Because of the strength of TikTok, which in turn affected Tencent's advertising revenue. From the first quarter of 2019 to the present, Tencent has experienced a decline in revenue from the first quarter of 2019 to now, either in online advertising or media advertising.

雖然騰訊總是甩鍋於宏觀環境的客觀原因，一次甩鍋還可以，但連續5個季度甩鍋那就是騰訊的不對了：

Although Tencent has always attributed the decline to the objective macro-environment. Doing this for the first time is acceptable, but saying the same thing for five consecutive quarters is Tencent's fault.

其實大家都知道，真正的原因是競爭對手的視頻對騰訊的廣告收入衝擊很大。

In fact, everyone knows that the real reason is that competitors' videos have a significant and negative impact on Tencent's advertising revenue.

所以我說抖音快手直接動了騰訊的根基，對騰訊的直接影響就是廣告收入的衝擊，說白了就是金主爸爸都不愛在微信上投放了，而是跑到抖音快手上了。

So, I said that TikTok and Kuaishou directly attacked Tencent's foundation. The direct impact is on the advertising revenue. To be frank, ad sponsors like to ditribute ads on TikTok and Kuaishou but not on WeChat.

02 騰訊沒壟斷什麼

講完了騰訊壟斷了什麼，接着說第二點：騰訊沒壟斷什麼？

After talking about what Tencent has monopolized, let's move on to the second point, what does Tencent not monopolize?

爲了更好地分析騰訊壟斷問題，這裏我們要引入一個“丹尼四象限壟斷模型”。

In order to analyze Tencent's monopoly better, here we will introduce Danny's Four-quadrant Monopoly Model.

模型的橫軸表示易壟斷還是難壟斷，模型的縱軸表示易改變還是難改變，注意這裏所說的難和易都是相對概念。

The horizontal axis of the model indicates whether it is easy or difficult to monopolize, and the vertical axis demonstrates whether it is easy to change or difficult to change. Difficult and easy mentioned here are relative.

舉個例子你就明白了，比如模型的左上角代表了“難改變+易壟斷”，典型的代表就是“菸酒油”行業，

For example,the upper left corner quadrant of the model represents difficult to change and easy to monopolize, the typical representative is the tobacco, wine and oil industries.

雖然這些行業我都做過諮詢項目，有一定的瞭解，但我在DannyData視頻裏就不具體說了，大家也都清楚這些行業“難改變+易壟斷”的原因，畢竟都是納稅大戶嘛，而且這也不是騰訊涉足的行業，說白了就是哪怕像騰訊這種互聯網大腿，想進也進不了的行業。

Although I have done some consulting projects in these industries and have a certain understanding, I will not talk about it in detail in DannyData's video. Everyone knows why these industries are difficult to change and easy to monopolize.

After all, they all are big taxpayers, and these are not the industries where Tencent is involved in. These industries leave no entrance for other companies, even Internet giants such as Tencent cannot get in.

再看模型的左下角，代表了“易改變+易壟斷”，典型的就是我在上一點講騰訊的核心業務，包括了社交、支付、遊戲等等，相對“菸酒油”來說“易改變”，比如遊戲短則幾個月，支付和社交長則幾年就要有一波鉅變，而“易壟斷”的原因我在上一點也說了，就是因爲梅特卡夫定理引起的網絡效應，天然形成贏家通喫。

As for the quadrant in the lower left corner, it means "easy to change + easy to monopolize." The typical example is the core business of Tencent that I mentioned earlier. It includes social network, payment, games and so on.

Compared with "tobacco, wine and oil", these businesses are easy to change. For example, every several months, there will be huge changes for games, and every few years there will be huge changes for payment and social network. The reason for "easy to monopolize" was also mentioned in the previous point, because the network effect caused by Metcalfe's Law naturally formed a winner-take-all situation.

那重點講講“丹尼四象限壟斷模型”的右上角，指的是“難改變+難壟斷”，這也是我所說的“騰訊沒壟斷什麼”。

The upper right corner of the Danny Four-quadrant Monopoly Model refers to difficult to change and difficult to monopolize, where Tencent has no monopoly in my opinion.

典型的就是馬化騰在最近財報裏反覆強調的“產業互聯網”：

The typical example is the Industrial Internet repeatedly emphasized by Ma Huateng in recent financial reports:

比如騰訊通過微信小程序賦能的一些傳統行業，你接觸比較多的就是去餐廳喫飯，桌上的掃碼點餐結賬，整體提高了餐飲行業的效率，也讓消費記錄可追溯，這就是產業互聯網的一種體現方式。再說前幾年有一陣連鎖餐飲行業在投資圈上了風口，並不是因爲這些品牌一定有多好喫，而是因爲微信支付、支付寶的存在使得消費記錄可追溯了，重建了整個加盟體系的商業邏輯，這個等我以後講移動支付專題再詳細聊吧。

For example, Tencent has empowered some traditional industries through WeChat Mini Programs. What you are more exposed to is when eating out in restaurants. By scanning the barcode on the table, you can make an order and pay the bills. And this has improved the overall efficiency of the catering industry, and the consumption records can also be traced back.

This is a manifestation of the Industrial Internet. Besides, in the past few years, the chain restaurant industry has gained popularity in the investment circle. This doesn't necessarily because the food of these brands is delicious but because the existence of WeChat Pay and Alipay makes the consumption records traceable, and rebuilds the business logic of the entire franchise system.

This will be discussed in detail later when I talk about mobile payments.

說實話，如果作爲一個商人，你面前就是擺着一個可以讓你壟斷的機會，你會拒絕嗎？我相信絕大多數商人當然不會拒絕，因爲壟斷才能產生超額利潤。

To be honest, if you are a businessman, and there's an opportunity that allows you to monopolize, will you refuse it? I believe that the vast majority of businessmen will certainly not refuse, because monopoly can produce excess profits.

而“丹尼四象限壟斷模型”的右上角，並不是騰訊不想壟斷，而是有兩個原因。

The upper right corner of the Danny's Four-quadrant Monopoly Model is not monoplized, not because Tencent is not willing to do so but for the following two reasons.

第一個原因是騰訊自身原因，有些是因爲精力顧不過來。

The first reason is Tencent's own reason that Tencent does not have enough energy.

連馬化騰自己都說數不清騰訊的產品有多少個，動不動哪個產品又和阿里競爭了；還有些是騰訊起步已晚或自身不具備基因，比如騰訊投資京東、拼多多、美團、甚至小破站等等，騰訊都有做過類似產品但做不起來，所以只能把曾經的小對手們招安到自己旗下了，用來對抗更大的Boss，那大Boss是誰呢？請彈幕告訴我。

Even Ma Huateng himself can't tell how many products does Tencent have, and which one is competing with Alibaba's products. There are also some cases where Tencent started too late or does not have "genes". Such as Tencent's investment in Jingdong, Pinduoduo, Meituan, and even Bilibili. Tencent has developed similar products but failed, so it can only recruit its former little rivals to fight against the bigger Boss. Who is the big Boss? Type it on the screen.

第二個原因是行業的特性本身就是“難壟斷”，不具備贏家通喫的網絡效應。

The second reason is that the characteristics of these industries themselves are difficult to monopolize and do not have the effect of winner-take-all.

比如線下商超，騰訊再怎麼努力也無法壟斷全部市場，大爺大媽纔不會管你這菜市場到底是不是騰訊開的，也不會攜手七大姑八大姨一起去買菜，就是因爲行業的特性分散難壟斷，所以騰訊只能靠投資一線選手入局。

For example, the offline supermarkets. No matter how hard Tencent tries to monopolize the entire market, nobody will care whether the grocery market is opened by Tencent, nor join a family grocery squad. It is because the characteristics of this industry are scattered and difficult to monopolize, so Tencent can only enter the game by investing in first-line players.

比如馬化騰所說：

“在跨界交叉融合的一些領域，找到發展的藍海，或者叫細分市場中的細分市場。”
As Ma Huateng said:
"It is necessary to find a blue ocean of development in some cross-border areas where exist intersection and integration. In other words, the market segments in market segments."

比如騰訊入股永輝超市，而且2018年騰訊還差點和永輝一起入股家樂福，結果被蘇寧插了一腿，這個等我以後講蘇寧時再詳細聊。

For example, Tencent took a stake in Yonghui Supermarket, and in 2018 Tencent almost took a stake in Carrefour with Yonghui. However, Suning intervened. This will be discussed in detail when I talk about Suning.

所以，騰訊通過投資一線選手入局“難壟斷、難改變”的行業，並通過“丹尼四象限壟斷模型”左下角給他們賦能，比如基於微信的微信支付和小程序等等，幫助他們增加效率的同時，自己也分一杯羹。

Therefore, Tencent has invested in first-line players to enter the “difficult to monopolize and hard to change” industries. And it has empowered them through the lower left corner of the Danny Four-quadrant Monopoly Model, such as WeChat payment and Mini Programs based on WeChat, to help them improve efficiency. At the same time, Tencent can also share a piece of the pie.

如果你還是分不清“丹尼四象限壟斷模型”左下角和右上角的區別，俞軍有一個公式可以輔助你理解：

If you still can't tell the difference between the lower left corner and the upper right corner of the Danny Four-quadrant Monopoly Model, Yu Jun has a formula to help you understand:

用戶價值=新體驗-舊體驗-替換成本

User Value = New Experience - Old Experience - Replacement Cost

你可以簡單理解爲左下角是“純互聯網”產品，右上角是“互聯網+”產品。

You can simply understand that the lower left corner is a "pure Internet" product, and the upper right corner is an "Internet +" product.

左下角的“純互聯網”產品，關鍵在於“替換成本”。憑藉超強的模仿能力，各家互聯網產品很快就會讓“新體驗-舊體驗”的差別不大，比如雷軍的米聊比微信還要早出現一個月，而且你要說微信有哪些功能是米聊做不到的嗎？基本上沒有。關鍵區別就在於替換成本，等你的七大姑八大姨都出現在微信上了，也就是替換成本特別高，哪怕米聊新體驗做的再好，但是替換成本太高了，以至於米聊提供的整體用戶價值太低了，所以用戶不願意放棄微信而去用米聊。

The key to the “pure Internet” product in the lower left corner is the “replacement cost”. With super imitation capabilities, various Internet products will soon narrow the gap between new experience and the old experience. For example, Lei Jun's MiChat launched a month earlier than WeChat.

Is there any function of WeChat that MiChat can't do? The answer is not. The key is the replacement cost. When your relatives and friends all use WeChat, that is, the replacement cost is particularly high. Even if the new experience of MiChat is very well, the replacement cost is so high that the overall user value provided in MiChat is too low to persuade users to give up WeChat and use MiChat.

但如果你藉助技術變革的風口，做了一款之前沒有的新產品，比如抖音快手，新體驗好，又沒有舊體驗，再加上開闢另一個戰場沒有太多替換成本，那麼提供的用戶價值就高。

But, if you take advantage of the technological revolution and develop an unprecedented product like TikTok or Kuaishou. Plus, the product has no old experience but only good new experience, and there's not much cost of entering another battlefield. Thus, the user value provided will be high.

而右上角“互聯網+”產品，替換成本往往比較低，也就是我之前所說的“難壟斷”，

The replacement cost of "Internet+" products in the upper right corner is often relatively low, which is what I refer to as "difficult to monopolize".

行業特徵就是難以一家獨大，“難改變”是因爲做的是“互聯網+傳統行業”的加法，相比於“純互聯網”產品不會出現顛覆式的大改變，所以重點就要看“新體驗-舊體驗”的差別，比如亞馬遜推出的無人超市Amazon Go，這個等我以後講亞馬遜時在詳細聊吧，你們感興趣嗎？

The feature of this industry is the difficulty for one company to dominate."Hard to change" is means the addition of "Internet + traditional industry" can hardly be overturned, compared with "pure Internet" products. The key is the difference between "new experience - old experience", such as Amazon Go, the unmanned supermarket launched by Amazon. The detail will be discussed when I talk about Amazon later. Are you guys interested?

凱文凱利在《新經濟，新規則：網絡經濟的十種策略》這本書裏提到：

Kevin Kelly mentioned in his new book New Rules For New Economy: Ten Strategies for Network Economy:

“提升網絡價值最快的方法，就是將其餘的一些小網絡引入到自己的網絡中，這樣，這個網絡集合體就能以更大的網絡形式運作。”
"The fastest way to increase the value of the network is to introduce some of the remaining small networks into your network so that this network assembly can operate in the form of a larger network."

騰訊就是通過微信小程序、微信支付等手段，將越來越多的小網絡引入到自己的社交大網絡中，進而鞏固自己中國社交老大的地位。換種說法就是騰訊通過主業賺錢做資本金，股票和債券融資做槓桿，專注投資頭部創業公司，通過渠道賦能增值。

Tencent has been introducing more and more small networks into its social network through WeChat Mini Program, WeChat payment and other means, thereby consolidating its position as the Chinese social-life leader.

In other words, Tencent makes money through its main business as its capital, leverages stock and bond financing, focuses on investing in head start-ups, and enables value-added business through its channels.

好了，這下你搞懂“丹尼四象限壟斷模型”的左下角和右上角了吧，你可能還會納悶："hold on, hold on 小丹尼你還沒講右下角“易改變+難壟斷”的是什麼呢？"

Well, now you understand the left lower corner and right upper corner of Danny's Four-quadrant Monopoly Model.You may wonder: "Hold on, hold on. You haven't yet talked about what's in the right lower corner, the 'easy to change' and 'hard to monopolize'."

03 騰訊以後還會壟斷嗎

別急，這就到我要說的第三點：騰訊以後還會壟斷嗎？

Don't worry, here's my third point: Will Tencent monopolize on anything in the future?

投資圈裏有一個"套路"問題：“如果騰訊或阿里也做了你現在創業做的這件事，你會怎麼辦？”我在朋友圈看到了戴雨森給出了一個很好的創業策略，簡單概括就是先打游擊戰，做那些互聯網大腿們看不上或者顧不上的領域、然後防禦、最後再去正面硬鋼。

There is a "routine" question in the investment circle: "If Tencent or Alibaba also did what you are doing now, what will you do?" Dai Yusen gave a wise entrepreneurship strategy, simply summarized, is to fight guerrilla warfare first, doing business in those areas that the Internet titans misprised or ignored, and then defend, and finally meet them head-on.

正如我之前在 DannyData視頻裏講的拼多多 和以後要講的快手，都是類似這麼幹的。

I've already analyzed PDD in previous DannyData video and I will talk about Kuaishou later. Both of them have done their business following this pattern.

以上說的是創業策略，我再補充一個找創業方向。

Above is about the entrepreneurship strategy and I will add one more direction for starting a business.

方向其實很簡單，就是“丹尼四象限壟斷模型”的右下角，即“易改變+難壟斷。”

It is actually very simple. The direction lies in the lower right corner of the Danny's Four-quadrant Monopoly Model, the "easy to change" and "hard to monoplize" area.

你現在就可以思考：有哪些行業是容易改變，而且又很難被巨頭壟斷呢？這兩者缺一不可，想清楚了這個問題，也就是像咱們這種草根創業者的機會。

You can think about it now: Which industry is easy to change and difficult to be monopolized by giants? The two are indispensable. Figuring this out and the opportunity will reveal for the ordinary entrepreneurs like us.

雖然騰訊覆蓋的業務已經很多了，但互聯網的魅力就是變化太快，變化太快的點不僅是創業者們最需要關注的創業方向，也是巨頭們最容易短視的點。

Although Tencent has already covered a lot of fields, the charm of the Internet is its fast-changing speed. The changing point is not only the new business direction that entrepreneurs need to pay most attention, but also the point where giants are most likely to be short-sighted.

正如張一鳴曾評價騰訊：

As Zhang Yiming once commented on Tencent:

“你在一個非常有前景，非常長的跑道上，你就應該低空飛行。他應該把之前的利潤都用到，再更深層次、給大規模的投入，騰訊和百度本可以取得更大的成就，相對來說他們更短視。”
"You should flyover if you're on a very promising and very long runway. It should invest all its profits to a deeper and large-scale level. Tencent and Baidu could have achieved greater success. They are relatively short-sighted."

那回答我的問題：騰訊以後還會壟斷嗎？

Let's answer my question: Will Tencent monopolize on anything in the future?

還是我們的老規矩，定義範圍，我們就說騰訊最關鍵的業務，也就是微信和QQ。

First, our old rules: defining the scope. We will talk about Tencent’s most critical business, WeChat and QQ.

我認爲騰訊在社交領域危機是不小的。

I think Tecent has a big crisis in the social network domain.

首先微信月活12億，基本在中國人的市場已經飽和了，增長緩慢但至少仍在增長，貌似危機不大，但增長空間已非常有限，因爲全球市場Facebook的地位難以撼動，至少可以撼動Facebook的絕對不能靠類似Facebook產品線的微信，就像我們常說的“顛覆微信的絕對不是另一個微信”。騰訊目前在全球市場的突破主要還是靠遊戲和投資，比如騰訊是全世界最大的遊戲公司。

First of all, WeChat has a MAU of 1.2 billion. The Chinese market is basically saturated, but at least the MAU keeps growing slowly. It seems that the crisis is not big. However, the room forgrowth has been very limited, since Facebook’s status is difficult to shake in the global market.

At least, we can not count on WeChat, which is similar to the Facebook product line, to shake Facebook. As we often say, "Another WeChat cannot overthrone WeChat." Tencent's current breakthrough in the global market relies mainly on games and investment. Tencent is the world's largest game company.

而騰訊更大的危機，可以從騰訊另外一個殺手級社交QQ上看出來。

The greater crisis of Tencent can be observed from another top social network tool QQ.

爲什麼我說QQ可以看出騰訊更大的危機呢？

Why do I say that QQ could reveal a bigger crisis?

你可以從DannyData數據可視化看出，騰訊現在還在公佈的數據是QQ智能終端月活躍賬戶數爲6.9億，同比下滑1%。

As you can see from the visualization of DannyData, the data that Tencent is still publishing is that the monthly number of active accounts of QQ mobile terminals is 690 million, down 1% year-on-year.

移動端QQ月活躍用戶數

貌似還好，估計你會反駁我：“這不就同比下滑1%，小丹尼你是不是危言聳聽？就這？”

It seems to be okay. You may refute me: "This is only a 1% year-on-year decline. Are you being an alarmist?"

雖然你看QQ同比下滑的不多，但注意這只是智能終端，而不是QQ整體月活躍賬戶數。其實騰訊在2019年四季度就不再公佈QQ的整體月活躍賬戶數了，所以我預計QQ整體月活躍賬戶數下滑更多。

Although there is not much decline in QQ's MAU year-on-year, note that this is only the MAU of mobile terminals, not the overall MAU of QQ. In fact, Tencent no longer announces the overall MAU of QQ since the fourth quarter of 2019, so I expect the overall MAU of QQ declined more.

類似我在之前 DannyData蘋果視頻 裏講到的，上市公司經常出現的情況是，那些不是被要求必須公佈的數字，只要一旦發現下滑趨勢，乾脆就不公佈了，比如之前蘋果的iPod、iPhone銷量數字，還有我說的騰訊QQ整體月活躍賬戶數不公佈都是如此。

This is similar to what I said in the previous DannyData video about Apple. For those non-required data, listed companies often stop publishing them as long as the downward trend is noticed, such as Apple’s previous iPod and iPhone sales figures and the MAU of QQ.

這種現象只有長期跟蹤這家公司財報的同學才能發現，否則你看到的財報全是好消息。長期跟蹤並讓你們看懂更客觀的數據，也是我們做DannyData的價值之一。

This change can only be noticed by those who have been following this company's earnings reports for a long time. Otherwise, all you'll see is good news. Following the financial reports in the long-term to help you read more objective data is one of the values that make us DannyData.

要知道QQ整體月活躍賬戶數下滑對騰訊的影響會更大，我們都知道“中老年人才玩微信，年輕人都玩QQ”，隨着年輕一代刷視頻越來越多，我是爲騰訊未來能否在社交上仍然能稱王稱霸，持懷疑態度。

The decline in the overall MAU of QQ will have a much bigger impact on Tencent. We all know that "the old only use WeChat, the young use QQ". As the younger generation swipes more and more videos, I'm skeptical that Tencent will be able to reign supreme on social media.

騰訊自己當然早知道這種危機了，很多年前馬化騰就在WE大會上說過：

Tencent itself has certainly known about this crisis, as Ma Huateng said many years ago at the WE conference：

“巨人倒下時，身上還是暖的”。
"The giant remains warm when it falls."

所以騰訊要靠投資來佈局未來，騰訊早在2018年底就投資了700家公司：

So Tencent has to rely on investment to lay out its future, and it has invested in 700 companies back in late 2018.

劉熾平在2018年初的騰訊投資年會上曾透露，騰訊投資的企業所新增的價值已經超過騰訊本身的市值。

Liu Zhiping revealed at Tencent's annual investment conference in early 2018 that the value added by Tencent's portfolio companies had exceeded the market capitalization of Tencent itself.

但投資解決不了所有佈局未來的問題，騰訊最怕的是那些自己投不進去的公司，比如字節跳動、阿里和國外那些互聯網大腿們。

But investment can not solve all the problems of the future layout. Tencent is most afraid of those companies that it cannot invest in, such as Bytedance, Alibaba and those foreign Internet giants.

我很認同張一鳴的一段話：

I agree with a comment made by Zhang Yiming:

“當初各個公司都在圍繞一些舊戰場或過渡站場在競爭，沒有往前看。現在看來，應用商店、PC、傳統的搜索引擎業務等都是過渡戰場，他們還是太迷戀舊的戰場或者舊的事物。現在也是一樣，他們倒回來跟頭條競爭，可能會影響看新事情的注意力。”

"In the beginning, each company was competing in some old battlefields or transitional sites and didn't look forward. Now it seems that the APP stores, the PC, the traditional search engine business, etc.

are all transitional battlefields, and they are too obsessed with the old battlefields or old things. It's the same now. They're turning back to compete with Toutiao, and this may attract their attention on viewing new things."

我認爲未來一定會變成虛擬視頻社交的時代，虛擬人物在虛擬世界裏溝通，類似電影《頭號玩家》，Facebook早在2014年就以20億美元收購了Oculus，在2017年推出了Facebook Space，一款與朋友一起在虛擬空間中使用的VR應用程序。

I think the future will definitely turn into the era of virtual video social network where virtual characters communicate in a virtual world, which is similar to the movie "Ready Player One." Facebook acquired Oculus for $2 billion back in 2014 and launched Facebook Space in 2017, which is a VR app to use with friends in a virtual space.

雖然目前VR和AR在大衆之中還沒有普及開來，但完全沒有普及並不是視頻社交本身的問題，而是基礎設施還不夠全面，而且缺少像移動互聯網時代微信這種殺手級應用，而且我們主要的交互設備手機還不夠給力。

VR and AR are not widespread among the general public,t this is not a problem with video socialization per se, rather a lack of infrastructure and a lack of a dominant app like WeChat in the mobile internet era. Plus, our main interaction device, the mobile phone, is still not powerful enough.

如果過渡到虛擬視頻社交的時代，天然過度更近的方式是抖音快手這種視頻平臺，而不是像微信這種以語音文字圖片爲主導的聊天工具，再加上騰訊在社交上不斷流失年輕一代用戶，這也是我說騰訊危機的重要原因。

If the transition to the era of virtual video social network, the natural transition is using a video platform like TikTok or Kuaishou rather than a chat tool like WeChat, which is dominated by voice, texts, and pictures. Plus, Tencent is continually losing young generation users on social networking, and this also contributes to Tencent's crisis that I mentioned.

騰訊當年砍掉了騰訊微博，日活曾經達到8700萬，雖然相比微博沒有抓住明星資源，但有大量的小鎮青年，移動互聯網的下半場無論是拼多多還是快手，都是從下沉市場起家，但騰訊放棄了騰訊微博，也放棄了這些小鎮青年，而且騰訊目前只能靠入局拼多多和快手去制衡阿里，其實如果當年騰訊微博沒有放棄這些小鎮青年用戶，而不是把電商押寶在被投資的京東和拼多多，或者短視頻集中在騰訊微博上去嘗試，目前騰訊可能也不會這麼被動。

Tencent dropped Tencent Weibo back then, which had a daily activity of 87 million. Not capturing celebrity resources as Weibo did, but there are small-town youths. In the second half of the mobile internet competition, Pinduoduo and Kuaishou both started from a sinking market. But Tencent gave upon Tencent Weibo and also these small-town youths.

And now, Tencent is only able to counterbalance Alibaba by investing in Pinduoduo and Kuaishou. In fact, if Tencent Weibo hadn't given up on these small-town young users back then, instead of betting on e-commerce by investing in Jingdong and Pinduoduo, or trying out short videos on Tencent Weibo,Tencent probably won't be so passive at present.

但歷史無法假設，頭條的產品負責人陳林曾評價：

But history cannot be assumed. Chen Lin, head of product at Toutiao, once commented:

“砍掉騰訊微博和微視，是騰訊犯下的兩個大錯。”
"Dropping Tencent Weibo and Weishi are two big mistakes Tencent made."

我表示贊同。

And I agree.

做個小結，今天我講了：

To make a recap, I covered the following points today:

1、騰訊壟斷了什麼？

2、騰訊沒壟斷什麼？

3、騰訊以後還會壟斷嗎？

1、What does Tencent monopolize?

2、Tencent did not monopolize what?

3、Will Tencent monopolize on anything in the future?

04 我的價值觀

講完了騰訊，接下來又到了我最想跟你們說的：我的價值觀。

Having talked about Tencent, it's time for what I want to talk to you about most: my values.

我的“同路人”觀衆們知道我在前幾集視頻裏講到了辯證法，說白了就是“隨我反駁”，或者叫“我當我自己的槓精”，那今天我就再自己槓自己一回：我在本集視頻裏聊了那麼多騰訊壟斷的問題，其實意義不大，我也希望你用張小龍的名言去看DannyData的視頻：

My fellow viewers know that I talked about dialectics in the last few episodes. To put it bluntly, "refute as I wish", or "I refute myself". So today I'll refute myself once again: I talked so much about Tencent's monopoly in this episode. in fact, it's not very meaningful. And I also hope that you can take Zhang Xiaolong's famous words to watch DannyData's video:

“我所說的都是錯的。”
"What I've said is all wrong."

其實我希望大家不要去過度關注“騰訊壟斷”的問題，因爲說實話，作爲一個年輕人，無論你是批判“騰訊壟斷”還是支持“騰訊壟斷”，與其關注國內這些互聯網巨頭是否壟斷，還不如多關注他們在成爲巨頭後，在承擔社會責任、投資基礎科學研究、探索尖端科技上都做了什麼。

In fact, I hope that we do not pay excessive attention to the issue of monopoly. To be honest, as a young person, it doesn't matter whether you are for or against Tencent's monopoly.

Instead of focusing on whether the domestic Internet giants are monopolies, more attention should be paid on what they have done after becoming giants in taking social responsibility, investing in basic scientific research and exploring cutting-edge technologies.

馬化騰：“雖然（中國）現在有講新四大發明，講移動支付在全球很領先，但現在我們一看，這些還都只是科技的應用，你迴歸到基礎的科學研究來說，整個中國基礎還是非常薄弱的。”

Ma Huateng:"Although (China) is now talking about the new Four Great Inventions and how the mobile payment is leading the world, if we take a look at them and we will find that these are still just the application of science and technology. The fundamental scientific research in China is still very weak."

騰訊是否壟斷或者是否通過一些不正當手段限制競爭，這個有國家去操心，不用我們去操心，況且我們操心也改變不了什麼，還不如去多操心一些我們能去改變的事。

Whether Tencent is a monopoly or whether it restricts competition through some unfair means is a matter for the country to worry about not for us. Besides, we can't change anything by worrying about it, so we might as well worry more about what we can change.

比如“看大，看小”，

Like "looking for a bigger picture, look at a small point."

說白了就是要用更廣闊的眼光去看世界，也要緊盯眼前更重要的事。

Put simply, viewing the world with vision while focusing on important matters at present.

先說“看大”，我們總是緊盯騰訊是否在中國市場壟斷了，還不如去關注一些更大的事情。

"Looking for a bigger picture" means that instead of always focusing on whether Tencent is a monopoly in the Chinese market, we might as well focus on something bigger.

比如我們總關注富豪的兒子又開了幾輛豪車、泡了幾個網紅，卻忽視今年諾貝爾獎獲得者又提出了哪些可能影響世界的理論。

For example, we may always focus on how many more luxury cars a rich man's son drives and how many hot girls he picks up, while ignore the worldwide influential theories proposed by this year's Nobel Laureates.

我們總關注快遞和外賣的速度能否再快點，卻容易忽視硬核科技如航天、芯片等發展速度；

We may always focus on whether the speed of delivery and takeaways can get any faster, but we tend to overlook the speed of development of hardcore technologies, such as aerospace and chips.

我們總關注一輛汽車的內飾是否豪華、做工是否粗糙、百公里加速是否又提高了一秒，卻容易忽視未來真正的核心競爭力自動駕駛、萬物互聯的發展速度；

We may always focus on whether the interior of a car is luxurious, whether the workmanship is rough, or whether the 100 km/h acceleration has improved by a second, but we tend to neglect the true core competencies of the future: the development speed of autonomous driving and the Internet of Everything.

說完了“看大”，再說“看小”。

That's that for "looking for a bigger picture". Let's move on to "looking at a small point"

與其盯着騰訊又在哪個領域壟斷了，還不如去看看眼前有哪些機會避開巨頭壟斷的領域，當年騰訊不也是從移動夢網的壟斷中闖出來的嗎？我們要抓住新技術變革的機會，避開巨頭的鋒芒，也就是我之前所說的看準“易改變、難壟斷”的機會。

Instead of focusing on the field in which Tencent has monopolized, it is better to see what opportunities are in front of you that can avoid the giant monopoly.Didn't Tencent also break out of the Mobile Dream Network monopoly?

We need to seize the opportunity of the new technological revolution, avoiding the giants. And this is what I said before, to find the"easy to change, hard to monopolize" opportunity.

當然，光看肯定是不夠的。看準了機會，更重要的是去行動。

Of course, finding it is not enough. What's more important is to take action after finding the right opportunity.

曾經有位哲人說過：“鍵盤俠才喜歡抱怨，牛人已經看準方向並行動了。”

As a philosopher once said:"Keyboard warriors like to complain, the great warriors have seen and acted on the right direction."

好吧，我承認這位哲人就是我自己，吹牛不是我的重點，重點是我想讓大家記住：

Well, sorry, that philosopher is me. Bragging is not my point, the point is that I want you to remember：

好點子+不行動=0

Great idea + No Action = 0

正如我喜歡的一句耐克廣告詞：Just do it. 幹就完事兒了。

Just as a Nike slogan that I like: Just do it. Yes, let's just do it.

除了"看大，看小"，Just Do It，最後我認爲還有非常重要的一點，那就是保持一個平和的心態去思考、去做事，避免過於激烈的情緒，甚至產生憤怒，因爲憤怒並不能幫我們解決問題，就像電影《三塊廣告牌》裏告訴我們的：

In addition to "looking for a bigger picture, look at a small point" and "Just Do It". Finally, I think it's very important to keep thinking and taking actions in a peaceful manner and avoid intense emotions and even anger. Anger does not help us solve problems, as the movie "Three Billboards Outside Ebbing, Missouri" tells us.

“憤怒只能產生更多憤怒。"

“Anger begets more anger.”

我是小丹尼，談車說科技。下集視頻我會講阿里，你想聽我講點什麼呢？歡迎給我留言，別忘了幫我分享，Techs Never Die，回見。

I‘m Danny. I talk about tech and cars. In the coming episode, I'll talk about Alibaba. What do you what to know? Please leave your comments. Don't forget to give me a "LIKE" and subscribe to my channel. Techs Never Die, see you next time.

文稿/配音 | 小丹尼

校對修改 | Emma、SE、Vivian、Xuyang、Scode

剪輯/視覺 | 羅兆吉、小丹尼、Alex、忠彥、新茹、雷傑、呂曉彬、馬曉羽、蔡慶俊

翻譯 | Xuyang、嘉瑤、楊墨、施震、Zelda

排版 | 李扁擔、Xuyang